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Abstract
Post-harvest loss is a major concern for global food security and the livelihoods of vulnerable small-holder
farmers. Current research is limited in scope to merely estimating physical losses, which ignores the many
effects of quality loss on value, food supply, health and safety, and ultimately, physical losses. To prevent
quality losses, one must understand the incentives that are causing or preventing their occurrence. I compare
the financial incentives to preserve grain quality, in the form of quality premia, in Bihar, India and Parana´,
Brazil. As a formal market with high transparency, low market power by intermediaries, and explicit quality
standards and premia, Parana´ is a reference point for how incentives can function in a small-holder grain
market. In particular, I investigate the role that high market power by agricultural intermediaries plays in
setting the price and quality premia in Bihar, and how this impedes incentives as are found in Parana´. To
estimate the premia in Bihar, I use a modified hedonic model, whose results are compared with stated price
schedules used by cooperatives in Parana´.
I find that high village market power decreases both the price and the premium a trader pays to house-
holds. Households who are unable to sell to another trader also receive lower prices than households who
are flexible in their choice of trader. I also find that households who produce low quality grain, on average,
sell to higher power traders. This suggests that households are responsive to financial incentives, or the lack
thereof, for grain quality. High power traders may be buying low quality grain at very low prices and manu-
ally improving the grain quality themselves, but this results in higher losses than if farmers were incentivized
to maintain quality.
Secondary analyses also investigate the relationship between technology, quality, and prices; region and
quality; and sale location and prices. The evidence suggests that technology adoption is also not compensated
in highly concentrated markets. However, farmers with market power sufficient to sell wheat or rice on-field
obtain a premium; this trend is not present for maize, for which on-field sales are customary.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Concern over global food security has caused resurgence in research on post-harvest loss. The Food
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reports that a third of all food is lost or wasted
worldwide (Aulakh & Regmi, 2013). The potential impact of a reduction in post-harvest loss, or the loss of
food from field to fork, is high. Not only would it increase the food available worldwide, but grain could be
made without putting further strain on the world’s resources, making this an “easy win.”
I investigate the incentives to reduce post-harvest loss throughout the grain supply chain. If farmers are
rational and they choose to incur losses, the current system of agriculture must not incentivize minimizing
post-harvest loss. Fafchamps, Hill, and Minten (2008) show that, under perfect competition, a consumer will
maximize utility by choosing a product for which the quality premium is equal to the marginal utility of that
quality as well as the marginal cost of producing said quality. Fafchamps et. al conclude that a low quality
premium either reflects a low marginal utility of an attribute or the fact that the attribute is not being
properly identified by the buyer. They stipulate, however, that there must be full transfer of information
throughout the entire value chain to achieve equilibrium premia (Fafchamps, Hill, & Minten, 2008). I test
the effects of high levels of market power by intermediaries on achieving equilibrium quality premia. By
using data from a formal and an informal setting, I also consider the role of the supply chain structure in
determining grain premia. Understanding how farmers respond to the incentives they currently face will
greatly improve the predictions of how farmers would respond to future post-harvest loss prevention efforts.
Only considering physical losses fails to account for the full impact of post-harvest loss on global food
security. To effectively address post-harvest loss, the definition of loss itself must be redefined, and this
should happen now, while resources and energy are being poured into the topic. Previous studies focused
on physical losses, but this narrow view ignores the numerous ways quality loss affects small-holder farmers
and the global food supply chain. First, loss in quality causes the grain to lose value, which directly results
in a loss in income to producers. This lost income could result in lower capital investment and higher losses
in future seasons. Inconsistent levels of moisture changes the measure of the amount of grain present, as a
loss in moisture makes the grain lighter and vice versa. Thus, even quantity losses will be masked without
appropriate moisture measurements. Other quality losses make food less nutritious or even toxic to the
consumer, such as growth of mycotoxins or improper use of pesticide. If quality losses become too severe
the food may no longer meet minimum marketing standards for human consumption, leading it to be used
for animal feed. Finally, quality losses early in the supply chain can lead to physical losses later on.
This thesis demonstrates a method to qualitatively and quantitatively investigate the causes, effects, and
value of quality loss of grain. I focus on two regions: Bihar, a state in Northern India, and Parana´, a state
in Southern Brazil. Brazil and India are both members of the BRICS group of emerging economies, and
the agricultural sector is an important source of employment and GDP for both countries. Fifty-five and
sixty-five percent of total area is used for grain cultivation in Parana´ and Bihar, respectively, with more than
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eighty percent of land holdings being classified as small in each state (BAMETI, 2015; Loyola, 2015). Both
states produce maize and wheat, with Bihar also producing rice and Parana´ producing soybeans. Both also
trade wheat and maize on the international market. Agricultural intermediaries facilitate the sales of grain
by small farmers to large buyers; they take the form of traders in Bihar and cooperatives in Parana´. There
are, however, great differences between the regions in terms of farm scale and marketing. The Brazilian
government definition of a small landholding is less than fifty hectares, while in Bihar it is less than two
hectares (BAMETI, 2015; EMATER, 2015). Grain markets in Bihar are informal, while those in Parana´ use
formalized quality standards. Methods of harvesting, drying, and storing also vary widely. These differences
will help demonstrate how features of the supply chain generate different incentives that can contribute to
post-harvest loss.
The market structures in Bihar and Parana´ also vary in the amount of market power held by farmers
and intermediaries. While farmers in Bihar often can only sell to one local trader, farmers in Parana´ are
members of multiple cooperatives and do business with private retailers directly. I ask how trader market
power and household’s ability to choose another trader affects the premia paid for quality. Farmers with
low market power relative to their trader would then choose to produce lower quality grain, as the marginal
benefit of producing quality is lower when high power traders pay low premia.
I develop a theoretical framework that models the decisions of farmers and traders regarding quality
premia. I represent the quality premia received by farmers as a function of the quality premia received by
traders and a pass-through coefficient. The model suggests that the price the trader receives is positively
related to the average price in the sale market and the trader’s ability to differentiate his services, and
negatively related to the number of traders in the market. Conversely, I find that the premium increases,
meaning the trader passes a greater portion of the price he receives on to the farmer, when the number of
traders increases or the trader becomes less differentiated.
I use an adapted hedonic model to test these relationships by including controls for an individual trader’s
vilage market power and the household’s ability to switch traders. I find that high village market power
by the trader and low flexibility for the household lead to both lower overall prices and low quality premia.
This information can be used to identify situations in which farmers are unlikely to be compensated for high
quality grain. I analyze the quality outcome of households for whom premia and low and find that they
respond to the lack of financial incentive by not producing high quality grain.
The data for the adapted hedonic model comes from a survey of 3,200 households in Bihar, which was
collected in Spring 2016. The quality premia estimated by the model are then compared to data on quality
premia from Parana´. I conducted interviews with 27 grain farmers, four grain cooperatives, 3 private grain
businesses, a transportation company, and a credit cooperative in Parana´ during Summer 2015. In addition
to comparing quality premia, I also use the data and anecdotal evidence to analyze how the differing supply
chain structures affect grain quality.
I make three primary contributions to the literature. First, I identify the financial incentives, or the lack
thereof, for all actors in the supply chain to reduce loss. Rather than simply estimating the losses farmers
are incurring or measuring the effects of an intervention, I ask why losses occur in the first place through an
analysis of the supply chain and an estimation of financial incentives. The use of contextual evidence, data,
and a theoretical model in multiple settings makes my findings more generally applicable.
Second, I empirically test whether and how trader market power affects the quality premia recevied by
traders. A high quality premia is a straightforward incentive to improve grain quality, but the premia is
not only determined by quality. I incorporate both the trader and farmer’s market power, which allows us
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to anticipate variation in quality premia based on the number of grain buyers in the market. A body of
literature has investigated quality premia, primarily as markets become formalized for export. Most notably,
Kariuki, Loy, and Herzfeld(2012) find that premia for GGAP (global good agricultural practice) certified
green beans rise throughout the harvest season, reaching 24% of price three weeks after harvest. They
include the log of the number of buyers in the market in their hedonic regression, finding that a 1% increase
in the number of buyers in the market leads to a 3.3% increase in price.
The unique primary data I use sets this thesis apart from the previous literature on premia. To my
knowledge, this is the first study to match buyers and sellers to measure both the household and their buyer’s
market power in informal markets. This thesis also exceeds previous studies in sample size of households
and villages. The large number of villages provides a better distribution of market power.
Finally, this thesis seeks to change the way researchers think about post-harvest loss. By broadening the
scope of losses to include loss in quality, and thereby value, I address a vital and often overlooked component
of post-harvest loss. Global food security, access to safe, sufficient, and nutritious food by all people at all
times is hindered by losses in monetary or nutritional value, which result from quality loss.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Post-Harvest Loss
I review three bodies of literature. First, I outline the causes of post-harvest loss and review the existing
literature on post-harvest loss in India and Brazil. This review illuminates how my focus on incentives to
reduce loss differs from and builds upon traditional work on post-harvest loss. Next, I review the body
of work on financial incentives for quality by examining the historical use of hedonic models in estimating
quality premia for food commodities. I then highlight way hedonic models have been recently adapted for
informal markets; the model I estimate is based on these recent adaptations. Finally, I consider non-pricing
incentives that are caused by the supply chain structure and review the literature on supply chain analysis.
2.1.1 Causes
I define post-harvest loss broadly as physical loss or quality loss that decreases the total value of the
agricultural product. Losses can occur at any stage from harvest until the grain reaches the end consumer.
Table 9.1 outlines the stages of the grain supply chain, as well as the actors, techniques, and types of loss in
each respective stage.
Although I break the supply chain into separate stages, the actions in one stage greatly affect the outcomes
in another. Small fissures in grain during harvest can lead to large breaks during drying. Inadequate drying
will result in spoilage during storage and higher losses during milling. It is therefore important to maintain
quality at each stage to prevent a loss in quality at an early stage from becoming a physical loss at a
later stage. To minimize PHL, the various actors throughout the supply chain must all be aware of and
incentivized to carry out best practices.
The level of losses incurred for any technique at any stage depends on the skill and care with which the
technique is carried out; a million dollar combine harvester will still cause losses when driven improperly. It is
critical that all machinery, including harvesters, threshers, trucks, and milling equipment, be well-maintained
and capably used. Cleanliness is vital at all stages to avoid pest infestation. Storage areas and mills should
be kept free from dirt, vegetation, and loose grains that may attract pests and rodents. Grain in bags should
not be stored directly on the ground, but raised onto a moisture-proof covering (Golob, 2007).
Manual practices are vulnerable to nature even when executed properly, however. This is particularly
true for drying and storage, where unexpected rainfall or a particularly humid season can lead to slow drying
and damp grain in storage. Relatively simple technology reduces variation due to nature. A solar dryer dries
grain more consistently and reliably than sun-drying. Hermetically sealed bags allow grain to respire; the
CO2 that is produced prevents the growth of mold or insect infestation. While pesticide and fumigation can
be used to prevent insect infestation during storage, this introduces concerns for human safety when used
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improperly (Damalas & Eleftherohorinos, 2011).
The exact definition of high quality grain varies from crop to crop, but high quality grain can generally be
described as follows: grain that is (1) free from insects, rocks, animal waste, glass, or other toxic or unknown
substances (termed as ”impurities” or ”foreign matter” depending on the country), (2) has very few broken
grains, (3) contains very few other grains (for example, soybeans mixed in a bushel of wheat), (4) is uniform
in color and size, and (5) falls below the acceptable moisture limit, which varies by crop.
Some factors that define a grain’s quality directly affect physical losses. Moisture content is a crucial
measure of how the grain will store. A high moisture content leaves grain vulnerable to spoilage, while
low moisture results in brittle grain that may shatter during milling or processing. Additionally, as grain
loses moisture it also loses weight. Since grain is purchased by weight, changes in moisture change its value.
Broken grains are more susceptible to mycotoxins; as a result of this concern as well as the importance of
physical appearance for certain products broken grains are less marketable (Jouany, 2007; FAO; IRRI). For
products that process grain further, such as flour and feed, broken grains may be used, but broken grains
are unacceptable for use as seed or other products where the grain remains intact. Foreign matter, such
as rocks, dirt, and other grains, can be removed, but doing so is costly and will reduce the grain’s weight
and make it less valuable. Some types of foreign matter, such as insects or animal waste make the grain
unhealthy to consume. Size and color are aesthetic factors that affect the marketability of grains, but are
not related to physical loss.
The importance of a quality differs not only by crop but also by stage in the supply chain. For example,
end users place an emphasis on physical traits that affect loss: moisture content, foreign matter, and broken
grains. Tables 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4 outline the US Department of Agriculture’s quality standards for wheat,
maize and soy; these standards are used for grains sold privately in the United States. Tables 9.5 and 9.6
list the quality standards for wheat and rice purchased by the Indian government; they are intended to be
used for all sales to the government, although anecdotal evidence suggests that use of standards is lax in
Bihar. Regardless of implimentation, it is still important to note that both governments place weight on the
amount of broken grains or foreign matter that may be present as well as the moisture content.
Stepping down the supply chain, intermediaries may have a different opinion of what determines grain
quality. In Bihar, agricultural traders still value low moisture content and a lack of impurities, but they also
list grain size as an important determinant of price. (Table 9.7). In Parana´, however, moisture level and the
amount of broken grains and impurities remain the only qualities that determine price.
At the beginning of the supply chain, farmers in Bihar agree with traders and end users that moisture
is the most important determinant of grain quality. However, they list size and color as the second and
third most important attributes in determining price, neglecting to mention broken grains or impurities. In
summary, closer in supply chain to the farmer, less emphasis is placed on qualities that may lead to future
loss and the more emphasis is placed on aesthetic qualities. I will discuss the causes and implications of this
disconnect more thoroughly in the results section.
2.1.2 Previous Estimations of Post-Harvest Loss
While the body of literature on post-harvest loss (PHL) is growing, there are still large gaps in the
research. There is not yet a single consistent definition of food loss or methodology to measure loss (Aulakh
& Regmi, 2013). Most estimates focus on physical losses and completely ignore losses in quality and resulting
value throughout the supply chain. Existing studies of physical losses vary widely in sampling strategy,
method of identifying losses, and results. Because post-harvest loss is contextual to crop and climate I
5
review studies of PHL of grains in India and then Brazil.
India
Four major studies of post-harvest loss of grains have taken place in India in the last fifteen years. All of
these studies have only considered physical losses, rather than including quality losses. With the exception
of Nanda et al. (2012), all estimates have been obtained through inquiry, or asking farmers to estimate their
own losses. Summaries of these studies can be found in table 9.8.
Nanda et al. (2012) conducted a multistage stratified random sampling of 12,000 households on behalf of
the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR). In addition to estimation by inquiry, they conducted
observations of loss for 20% of the sample, or 2,400 households; results of the two methods were pooled. They
find total losses of 6.36% for paddy, comprised of 3.91% in farm operations, defined as harvesting, threshing,
winnowing/cleaning, and drying, 1.93% in farm level storage, and 0.52% in godowns, or government storage.
Total losses for wheat were 7.32%, with 4.67& in farm operations, 1.93% in on farm storage, and 0.72% in
godown storage (Nanda, Vishwakarma, Bathla, Rai, & Chandra, 2012). In a second study by ICAR, overall
losses for paddy, wheat, and maize were found to have fallen to 5.53%, 4.93%, and 4.65%, respectively. Of
these, farm losses were found to make up 4.67%, 4.07%, and 3.90%. Prior to that, the Ministry of Agriculture
of India surveyed 15,000 cultivator households using a stratified random sampling from 1996-1999. They find
producer level losses, defined as losses during threshing, winnowing, on-farm transport, and on-farm storage,
of 2.72% of total production for paddy, 2.45% for maize, and 1.79% for wheat (Directorate of Marketing and
Inspection, 2002, 2005; Shroff & Kajale, 2013).
These studies do not account for quality loss, which could affect results. Variation in moisture content
throughout the post-harvest process directly affects the weight of the grain; quantity losses are measured
using weight. Increases in moisture level could therefore be masking the full extent of quantity losses.
Additionally, anecdotal evidence calls the numbers into question. The most recent ICAR study found that
0.07% of paddy, 0.03% of wheat, and 0.04% of rice are lost in government storage (godowns) (Jha et. al,
2015). These remarkably low levels are at odds with reports that shortage of space in godowns forces grain
to be stored in reused gunny sacks or in the open (Pal, 2016; The Tribune India, 2016).
Two small-scale studies have been conducted in individual states in India. Basavaraja et. al (2007)
carried out a survey of 100 farmers as well as, 20 wholesalers, 20 processors, and 20 retailers in Karnataka.
They defined farm level losses as losses during harvest, threshing, cleaning, and drying. They find farm
level losses of 3.82% for rice and 3.28% for wheat (Basavaraja, Mahajanashetti, & Udagatti, 2007). Shroff
and Kajale similarly surveyed 100 farmers in Maharashtra using a stratified non-random sampling technique.
Losses are divided into three categories: on-farm, which includes harvest, threshing, winnowing, and storage;
transportation from farm to market; and storage off-farm. They find that on-farm maize losses are equal
to 1.69% of production for marginal farmers (<1 ha), 2.00% for small farmers (1-2 ha), and 2.1% for semi-
medium farmers. Again, these studies ignore quality loss, and they also rely on limited samples. More
importantly, all of these studies merely tally losses without investigating the motivations behind them.
Despite their underestimation of full losses due to the omission of quality, these studies estimate losses
that are enormous in magnitude. Nanda’s estimate of 6.36% paddy loss is equal to 3.46 million kg, when
taken as a percent of Bihar’s 2004 harvest. This loss would be sufficient to provide 44,422 individuals with
a year’s worth of rice at India’s average per capita consumption levels (Mohanty, 2013). For wheat, a 7.32%
loss is equivalent to 2.70 million kg, or a year’s worth of wheat for 36,000 individuals (Indexmundi, 2015).
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Brazil
Grain production in Southern Brazil varies greatly from that of the mega-farms in the Center West, including
Mato Grosso. Southern production occurs on relatively small family operated farms; 87% of farms in Parana´
are less than 50 ha with family members accounting for at least 50% of labor. I therefore primarily review
studies from comparable settings in Brazil, rather than the large-scale farms in Mato Grosso.
Research on post-harvest loss in Brazil is predominantly focused on losses incurred during harvest with
combines. EMBRAPA, the federal agricultural research agency of Brazil, has developed a method of measur-
ing soybean losses by sectioning off small portions of the field after harvest and collecting remaining grains in
a cup, and many studies obtain estimates by using this method on 40-100 plots in a small region (Chioderoli
et al., 2011; Maurina 2015; Pereira da Silva & Carvalho Filho, 2005; Schanoski, Righi, & Werner, 2011;
Toledo et al., 2008). These results are then compared to the level of losses that is accepted by convention
in Brazil: 60kg (one Brazilian saco) per hectare (for soy), or roughly losses of 2.5% (Toledo et al., 2008).
Schanoski, Righi, and Werner find that 79% of combines in Maripa´, Parana´ lose more than 60 kg, per hectare,
while Toledo, Tabile, Pereira da Silva, Furlani, Magalha˜es, and Costa find that median losses in Jabotical,
Sa˜o Paulo are just below, at 58.8kg/ha (Schanoski et al., 2011; Toledo et al., 2008).
EMATER, the state agricultural extension agency of Parana´ claims that by training farmers in a week
long orientation and publicly awarding the combine driver with the lowest losses with a prize such as a
motorcycle, harvest losses have fallen from 72kg/ha to 12kg/ha over the course of 16 years in Ibipora˜ and
from 48kg/ha to 26.4kg/ha over 12 year in the region surrounding Maringa´. Regions that adopted this
program of training and prizes later are also beginning to see improvements (Maurina, 2015). Pereira da
Silva and Carvalho Filho use the results of their 2005 study to model harvest losses of grain in Minas Gerais
as a function of velocity, the age of the combine, whether it uses the axial or radial system, and whether the
combine is owned or rented. They find that losses are higher with rented combines and combines that are
more than 5 years old (Pereira da Silva & Carvalho Filho, 2005).
A few studies address losses in the supply chain after harvest in Brazil. Dr. Jose´ Caixeta Filho et. al
from University of Sa˜o Paulo-ESALQ, studied post-harvest losses of wheat in Rio Grande do Sul using a
convenience sample of thirteen cooperatives, mills, and transportation companies. They find a loss of 11.8%
of total production between the farm and the mill, 6% of which occurs on farm, 5% occurs in the cooperative,
and 0.8% of which occurs during transportation. EMBRAPA, the federal agricultural research agency of
Brazil, outlined the entire supply chain of maize across eight states including Parana´. The state of agriculture
in Brazil has changed greatly since the study was conducted in 1997, but at that time they found harvest
losses of 8-10% when using a combine, 0.5% short haul (farm to cooperative) transportation losses, and 2%
storage losses in modern storage facilities (EMBRAPA, 1997). As in Bihar, however, these studies do not
account for changes in quality, including moisture content. A project between the University of Illinois and
Universidade Federal Mato Grosso-Sinop is developing a methodology for monitoring the moisture content,
temperature, and carbon dioxide levels of grain during long-haul transportation via truck. They find wide
variations in moisture content in truck beds (Wilhelmi, Danao, Zandonadi, & Gates, 2014). This technology
will be useful in measuring quality losses in future studies.
Another potential cause of losses is the fact that logistics has lagged behind the rapid increase in Brazil’s
grain production. Deckers do Amaral (2014) reviews the logistical obstacles to dealing with Brazil’s sharp
increase in grain production. Growth in storage capacity has lagged behind production; in 2014 production
rose to 194 million tons, while storage only reached 148 million tons. This prevents farmers from marketing
grain at the optimal time and results in tons of grain waiting in improper storage in the port. Sixty
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percent of the country’s grain is transported by highway; road transport is inefficient over long distances
due to the high cost and high losses. Deckers do Amaral calls for an increase in infrastructure investment
to maintain the country’s competitiveness; many of these investments would also combat post-harvest loss
(Deckers do Amaral, 2014). As in India, these studies, with the exception of Wilhelmi et. al, solely measure
quantity. None consider the causes of loss, although Deckers do Amaral unintentionally discusses the topic
by evaluation logistical constraints.
2.2 Price Incentives for Quality
Financial incentives to preserve quality are present when an individual quality characteristic is determi-
nant of a good’s price. Sherwin Rosen first estimated the implicit price of individual traits in his 1974 paper,
”Hedonic Pricing and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition” (Rosen, 1974). The
hedonic model he introduced in that paper has been used frequently to estimate price premia of agricultural
products (Costanigro, 2007; Espinosa & Goodwin, 1991; Gulseven & Wohlgenant, 2014; Nguyen, 2012). In
each case, the authors use abundant price and quality data to estimate total price as a function of the prod-
uct’s quality. Costanigro (2007) uses the ten years of data on wine from Wine Spectator magazine, Espinosa
and Goodwin (1991) gather seventeen years of prices of wheat in Kansas, Gulseven and Wohlegenant (2014)
collect household surveys on milk consumption based on price and characteristics, and Nguyen (2012) uses
seven years of data from auctions of mussels. All of the previous papers make use of formal markets and
corresponding formal quality standards, which are not present in Bihar.
Recently, the hedonic model has been used in less formal markets; to do this the authors incorporate
factors other than quality into the equation. Kariuki, Loy, and Herzfeld (2012) estimate the quality premia
awarded to GGAP (global good agricultural practice) certified green beans in Kenya, which are exported
to Europe. Using the prices and self-reported quality of the past six sales of 249 farmers, they find that
farmers with FFAP certification receive a 9.4% price premium compared to non-certified farmers, controlling
for spatial, seasonal, marketing, and quality factors. This premia varies throughout the season, however,
with certified farmers not experiencing the full decrease in price throughout the season faced by non-certified
farmers; the quality premia reaches 24% of price three weeks after harvest. Notably, the authors include
the number of sellers and buyers in the market as controls and find that price increases by 3.3% with a 1%
increase in the number of buyers in the market. Despite the profitability of the industry, particularly for
GGAP certified farmers, small-holders face barriers to entering the export market including high investment
costs, imperfect contracting, lack of access to credit, and lack of information (Ashraf, Gine´, & Karlan, 2009;
Okello & Swinton, 2007; Rosch & Ortega, 2014). In particular, Okello and Swinton (2007) find that small-
holders organize in groups to gain access to exporting buyers, who prefer to minimize monitoring costs by
buying from large scale producers, as well as to share the cost of meeting certification standards. This market
therefore can be seen as a stage between Bihar, without formal quality standards, and Parana´, where large
cooperatives have formed to overcome barriers to export for small-holders.
The setting I model in Bihar most closely resembles the work by Brett Hueth and Pilar Jano (Jano &
Hueth, 2014) and Didier Kadjo, Jacob Ricker-Gilbert, and Corinne Alexander (2015), who again include
variables affecting price in informal markets. Hueth and Jano estimate the implicit prices for Ecuadorian
cocoa. They first establish a theoretical model that shows that the quality premium offered by traders is
negatively related to the farmers’ risk aversion and the variance of the effect of effort on quality. Their model
predicts that the price premium a trader offers is positively related to the price the trader receives for quality
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from end users. Using a stratified (non-random) sample of 327 farmers, they estimate the implicit prices
of production and post-harvest actions undertaken by farmers that affect quality, distinguishing between
actions that are easily identifiable off-farm and those that can only be identified when a buyer purchases
on farm. They find that quality is rewarded via price premia for actions that affect quality; actions that
are easily identifiable are more rewarded, but actions that affect lower-value characteristics receive a larger
relative premium. They hypothesize that actions which affect low-value characteristics are more rewarded
because they are easier to identify, have higher costs, or are more responsive to incentives (Jano & Hueth,
2014).
Kadjo, Ricker-Gilbert, and Alexander estimate price discounts for maize subjected to various degrees of
insect damage in Benin. They survey 360 randomly selected maize farmers on the price and quality of maize
they sold at last harvest. They include variables for the time of sale; household demographics including
distance from market, saving, and income; quantity sold; and the type of buyer. Their estimation finds
that there are high price discounts for poor quality at harvest, but these discounts drop in the lean season
when the supply of maize is low (Kadjo, Ricker-Gilbert & Alexander, 2015). This effect may be the result
of market power’s effect on premia; as trader’s gain market power, they differentiate price based on quality
less. Households become more desperate for income during the lean season, giving the trader higher power
in the sale.
Two papers introduce theoretical concepts that are pivotal for modeling implicit price in informal markets.
Kvaløy shows that a farmer’s bargaining power at the time of sale determines the incentive pay for high
quality, as do his risk aversion and the variance in the distribution of quality in the region. Without
bargaining power, it may be impossible for a farmer to obtain a high quality premia, and when bargaining
power is high, the premium will likely be high. Kvaløy finds that quality premia are still a positive function
of the farmer’s incentive responsiveness and a negative function of risk aversion and the variance of yield
(Kvaløy, 2006). More importantly, he shows that these results can hold in the case of both formal and
informal contracts.
Fafchamps, Hill, and Minten (2008) show that a consumer will maximize utility by choosing a product
for which the price premium for quality characteristics is equal to the marginal utility of that quality as
well as the marginal cost of producing said quality. Therefore, a low price premium either reflects a low
marginal utility of an attribute or the fact that the attribute is not being properly identified by the buyer.
To achieve an efficient equilibrium, there must be full transfer of information throughout the entire value
chain (Fafchamps, Hill, & Minten, 2008)
2.3 Alternative Incentives Caused by the Supply Chain
While prices are the most obvious way to incentivize an action, there are additional types of incentives
that act upon buyers and sellers. Many of these incentives are caused by the way that actors relate to each
other and the market. The study of the relationship between buyers, sellers, processors, the government,
and all other actors in a market is called supply chain analysis.
Ronald Coase’s fundamental paper, Nature of the Firm, is still the building block of any supply chain
analysis. He establishes that firm size tends to be larger, or carry out more transactions when (1) there are low
costs of organizing employees, capital, contracts, etc., (2) costs increase slowly as the number of transactions
increase, and (3) the likelihood of entrepreneurial error remains low as the number of transactions increases
(Coase, 1937). Paul Joskow shows that vertical integration is more likely as firms become larger and assets
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become more specific, or difficult to use for another purpose; he uses data from the automobile industry
to illustrate his hypothesis(Joskow, 1988). Sherwin Rosen establishes the fundamental agency problem:
contracted workers, or agents, will only behave honestly when they are doing so in their own self-interest.
That is, they must be rewarded for good behavior and punished for bad behavior (Rosen, 1988). Reputation
is also pivotal in establishing contracts and preventing malfeasance or moral hazard. A poor reputation
preventing one from obtaining future contracts can serve as punishment that leads workers to behave honestly
(Allen & Lueck, 2003; Ho¨rner, 2002; Rosen, 1988).
The Nature of the Farm applies these theories to agricultural firms. First, Allen and Lueck argue
that complete contracts are not attainable in farming, as uncertainty from nature leads to problems in
enforcement. They find that since neither land nor human capital is specific in farming, simple rental
contracts are often used rather than vertical integration. They describe this system as a tradeoff between
specialization and moral hazard versus timeliness, the latter being particularly prevalent at harvest. A
farmer will gain specialization of labor by contracting labor, but he risks the worker shirking or not being
available at the time of harvest. Similarly to Coase, they find that farmers are more likely to own an asset
when timeliness costs are high, capital constraints are low, gains from asset and labor specialization are low,
and moral hazard is high. Using data from US firms, they show that high capital constraints decrease rates
of ownership (Allen & Lueck, 2003). Because contracted laborers are more susceptible to moral hazard, they
may shirk actions that prevent PHL. This phenomenon is measured in Parana´ by Pereira da Silva et. al, as
they find that rented combines have higher losses than combines that are owned by the driver.
Goldsmith, Martins, and de Moura (2015) study incentives to try to determine the optimal level of losses
in soybeans. The study uses a combination of in-depth interviews and survey of large-scale soy and maize
farmers in Mato Grosso, Brazil. They find that highly educated and experienced farmers still accept losses
of 6% at harvest and 2% during short haul transportation. Farmers accept these losses due to the timing of
the harvests; maize must not be planted later than February 15th-25th, or farmers risk reduced yield as the
dry season sets in and interferes with pollination. These weeks may overlap with the soybean harvest, so
farmers take action to complete the soybean harvest earlier to ensure that the maize will be well-pollinated.
Actions that speed harvest, such as dessicating the plants, or removing its leaves, and driving combines at
higher speeds, also lead to higher levels of post-harvest loss. Therefore, Goldsmith et. al conclude that there
exists a rational level of losses in this setting (Goldsmith, Martins, & de Moura, 2015).
Kumar (2014) considers the role of information in the supply chain of soybeans in Malwa, India. She finds
that information alone is not sufficient to guarantee that farmers will obtain better prices. This is particularly
true in developing contexts, where market relationships are affected by local power structures and historical
relationships. These complicated structures may artificially inflate transaction costs, leading farmers to sub-
optimal outcomes. In Malwa, increased price information and the elimination of intermediaries did not lead
to empowerment of small farmers. As Kumar suggests, information is not a sufficient condition to reach
equilibrium in developing contexts. Analyses of supply chain structures and pricing decisions must take into
account local geography, history, power, and farmer’s access to market (Kumar, 2014).
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Chapter 3
Data
Data for this study come from a baseline household survey and a trader survey in India as well as
structured interviews with key informants in the grain supply chain in Brazil.
A total of 3,200 household surveys were collected in Bihar. The sampling strategy was as follows. Two
districts were non-randomly selected in each of the regions surrounding Bihar Agricultural University and
Rajendra Agricultural University for a total of four districts. Within each district two blocks were randomly
selected, excluding blocks in which the crops of interest are not cultivated. Data from the 2011 census were
used to create a list of villages in each block with less than 1,500 households, to ensure that villages are
homogenous in size. Eight villages were randomly selected from each block using this list.
Once villages were selected, a village level survey was conducted by enumerators in June and July 2015.
During this time enumerators gathered list of the households in each village from the local government
register.
Enumerators also surveyed agricultural traders operating in the villages at this time. The sampling
strategy was exhaustive; all traders working within sample villages were surveyed for a total of 107 over 49
villages. Of these, 105 trade wheat, 100 trade maize, and 70 trade rice. They work in an average of 3.85
villages, and buy grain from an average of 74.57 households. A full set of summary statistics is discussed in
section 4.2 and is listed on table 9.13.
Fifty households were randomly selected in each village using the lists of households obtained during
the village survey. The baseline household survey took place in from November 2015 - February 2016. All
randomized selection was performed in Stata.
Of the 3,200 households surveyed, 346 commercialize wheat, 298 commercialize maize, and 298 commer-
cialize rice. Their average land holding is 1.417 hectares. Households summary statistics are discussed in
section 4.2 and reported in table 9.11.
Future stages of the study will assign households to treatment and control arms, but the purpose of this
paper is to evaluate the existing pricing methods, so no treatment was administered.
Information on Brazil comes from interviews conducted with 27 farmers as well as employees at four grain
cooperatives, three private grain businesses, a transportation company, and a credit cooperative. Interviewees
were chosen by a convenience sample. Employees of EMATER, FAEP/SENAR, and Sindicato Rural assisted
me in contacting and reaching farmers and processors.
In the sample of Brazilian farmers, 19 sell wheat, 25 sell maize, and 26 sell soy. They plant an average
of 165.97 hectares in grains and work with an average of 2 intermediaries (table 9.9).
11
Chapter 4
Background and Supply Chain
4.1 Brazil
Parana´ is a small state in Southern Brazil. With 20.0 million ha it accounts for only 2.3% of Brazil’s
area, but it is the country’s fifth largest state economy and second largest producer of grains. Brazil is
the world’s largest producer of soybean, and the third largest producer of corn (Loyola, 2015). National
production of grains (including soy, wheat, and corn) has increased 57.5% since 2003, from 123.2 to 194
million tons (Deckers do Amaral, 2014). Parana´, therefore, is increasingly important to national and global
grain supply. Fifty-five percent of the state is planted in grains, and agribusiness accounts for 34% of GDP
in Parana´ (Loyola, 2015). Parana´ has a subtropical climate, so it experiences more distinct seasons than
the largest grain producing state, Mato Grosso. Today, soy is the main cash crop, and is grown during
the summer months (September-February). Maize or wheat is planted in the second season, harvested in
August.
In a state of 10.4 million people, there are 1.53 million people living in rural areas and 532,840 farms. Of
these, 87% are considered small by government standards (less than 50 ha). The income level is close to the
national average, with a GDP per capita of US$10,400 compared to US$11,384 nationwide (World Bank,
2015). A history of government support, agricultural innovation, cooperatives, and a well-integrated supply
chain facilitate the success of relatively small family farms (Loyola, 2015). Their abundance and willingness
to adopt new technologies makes the small-holder farmers of Parana´ an excellent population for a study on
post-harvest loss.
The production of grain in Parana´ dates back to 1975, when a severe frost killed nearly all of the state’s
coffee plants, the region’s original cash crop. Rather than risk a similar loss in the future, farmers adopted
soy, wheat, and corn. This switch was encouraged by the federal govermnent, whose policies in the 1970s
sought to expand the soybean industry (Schnep, Dolhman, and Bolling, 2012). It is important to recognize
that the thriving agribusiness environment and supply chain of Parana´ today came about only recently; as
few as fifty years ago much of the state was still frontier.
Parana´ teaches us about small-holder farming for two important reasons. First, the state’s recent tran-
sition from a frontier sheds light onto what efforts are effective in developing formal grain markets. Second,
although the properties in Parana´ are large compared to those in Bihar, contextually they are small. Pro-
ducers on fifty hectares in Parana´ must compete with farms on thousands of hectares in Mato Grosso.
Consolidation was a frequent topic during interviews; farmers with small properties must rent their land
to larger operations, because production costs are too high to profitably produce grains on less than 50
hectares. Similarly, many small properties are switching to horticultures or livestock, which offer a high
profit per hectare. These two phenomena show that grain farmers on less than fifty hectares face the chal-
lenges of a small-holder farmer.
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The supply chain for grain in Parana´ is as follows and is outlined in figure 9.1. Prior to harvest, a
farmer purchases inputs from a cooperative or private grain buyer. Payment can be made at the time of the
purchase in cash, using financing from a bank, or by contracting with the cooperative to pay at the time of
harvest in cash or in grain. Farmers often use a mix of the four methods as necessary, but most prefer to
pay in cash at the time of sale if possible.
All on farm activities, including planting, fertilization, pesticide application, and harvest, may be per-
formed by the farmer with his own machinery or by a contracted third party. The price of new equipment
as well as the labor intensity required for these activities makes it more economical for many farmers to
pay a neighbor with the appropriate equipment to perform them. Of the farmers I interviewed, 37.5% used
contracted labor for harvest (table 9.9).
Farmers transport grain to a cooperative immediately after harvest (prior to cleaning or drying) using
their own truck or hired transportation; 54% of interviewees hired transportation rather than transporting
grain themselves. Hired drivers are paid a flat rate per trip, and farmers complain of carelessness with respect
to securing the load and irresponsibly fast driving. Contracts for transport cannot be performance-based,
however, as farmers do not weigh grain on-farm and cannot ascertain the amount of grain a driver loses
during the haul. Since the trip from farm to cooperative is usually less than 15km, losses are likely low
enough that farmers still prefer to lose a bit of grain at the hands of hired drivers than to invest in their own
truck or on-farm scales.
High contracting rates, and thereby low vertical integration, are likely the result of low coordination
costs compared to the cost of the assets. The market for contracted combine and truck drivers is large and
well-established, while a combine costs hundred of thousands of US dollars and must be imported at high
exchange rates. When contracting rates are high, it is important that workers be rewarded for low losses
and penalized for high losses (Rosen, 1988).
Combine drivers are rewarded financially for low losses by prizes given through EMATER’s harvest
competition. More importantly, EMATER makes their losses public to all farmers in the area, making
it important for drivers to protect their reputation to win future contracts. Despite these efforts, Pereira
da Silva and Carvalho Filho still find higher loses for rented combines, showing that agency problems are
pervasive.
Transportation from the cooperative to the farm in Parana´ is plagued with moral hazard. Because
farmers cannot determine losses on the road, payment does not vary with losses and drivers reputations are
virtually homogenous. As trucks have very low asset specificity, even compared to other agricultural assets,
one would expect this to be last asset for which farmers would switch to ownership. Rates of contracting
are likely to remain high, resulting in high losses, unless a system of monitoring is established.
On-farm storage is very rare in Parana´, particularly for small-holders. Of the farmers I interviewed, only
one stored on-farm, and his property was over 2,200 ha. Farmers consistently explained that on-farm storage
was not worth it given the size of their properties. On-farm storage requires a large initial investment
for storage infrastructure, additional labor to manage and guard the grain, and technical knowledge on
maintaining grain quality. Meanwhile, cooperatives store grain at minimal cost to the farmer; the cost of
storage is incorporated in the sale price of the grain, but any additional profits are returned to farmers,
reducing the cooperative’s incentives to over-charge for storage. Furthermore, cooperatives employ engineers
and agronomists to care for the grain. Six main grain cooperatives or agribusinesses operate in Parana´’s
North. On average, the farmers interviewed currently do business with two cooperatives or agribusinesses
to store and market their grain, giving the farmer some flexibility and ability to compare prices.
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Upon arriving at the cooperative, grain is weighed and its quality is measured using mechanized equipment
to measure moisture content, foreign matter, and broken grains. The weight that a farmer is entitled to sell
is calculated based on the percentages of moisture content, foreign matter, and broken grains using a fixed
schedule. These schedules, which can be seen in Tables 9.16 and 9.15 , are readily available, and cooperatives
match the penalties of their regional competitors. If a farmer is unsatisfied with his grain’s rating, he may
request a retest, which will be performed in his presence. After a quality is agreed upon, the farmer is issued
a receipt notifying him of the quantity of grain he may sell through the cooperative.
From this point on, the cooperative is responsible for all handling of the grain. It cleans, dries, and stores
the grain until the farmer is ready to sell his grain. When the farmer notifies the cooperative it then sells
the grain to an international buyer such as Bunge, Cargill, or ADM. The farmer receives the Price of the
Day, which is based off the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, exchange rates, and the cost of transportation
and processing borne by the cooperative.
This system makes loss prevention in the cooperative’s best interest. If the cooperative loses a high
percent of grain in processing or storage, they must still pay the farmer for the entirety of his grain that
he delivered. Therefore, cooperatives and farmers have established contracts that penalize a cooperative for
shirking. In an agricultural community, cooperative’s reputations are also well-known. Each cooperative
presents results to their members, often bi-annually. Should a cooperative’s reputation become tarnished,
farmers may easily switch to another local cooperative or form a new cooperative, or a new cooperative may
move in from a nearby region.
Today, the Brazilian government offers several forms of assistance for small-holder family farms. Trato´r
Solida´rio is a program of the state government that finances the purchase of tractors and combines. PRONAF,
a federal program, offers credit for the cost of production as well as investment for family farmers and
assentados (poor families to whom the government allocates land conditional on it being used for agriculture)
at a low interest rate. Farmers must verify their eligibility, determined by farm size, share of farm labor
employed from the family, planting and harvest time, and forest reservation, through a government agency.
Plano Safra, or Harvest Plan, procures 30% of horticultural products grown by small-holders for use in public
programs such as schools and the armed forces. This is not, however, the practice for grain. (Rousseff et al.,
2015). Extension agencies such as FAEP/SENAR and EMATER offer training and courses in production,
harvesting, environmental practices, crop diversification, and much more.
4.2 India
Bihar is a state in Northwest India with an area of 9.4 million hectares. In 2011-2012, the net sown area
was 5.4 million hectares, or 57.6% of total area. Of this area, 90% was planted in food grains, mostly rice
and wheat (Government of Bihar Finance Department, 2015). In 2006 3.1 million ha were planted under
paddy, 2.0 million under wheat, and 468 thousand under maize (BAMETI, 2007). The rain-fed crop, known
as the kharif crop, is harvested in October and November. The second season crop, known as the rabi crop,
must be irrigated, and is harvested in March. Rice is a kharif crop, wheat is a rabi crop, and maize is grown
in both seasons. The gross net sown area aggregating the two (rabi and kharif) seasons is 7.9 million ha.
The 2011 national census recorded a population of 104.1 million living in Bihar, making it the 3rd
most populous state in India (Indian National Census, 2011). It is also one of the poorest. The annual
income per capita in 2013-2014 was only 39.2% of the national average, at US$ 235. While this is a marked
improvement from 2009-2010, when income per capita was US$159, or 31.1% of the national average, 33.7%
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of the population remains below the poverty line. Nine out of ten people live in villages, and agriculture
accounts for 19.4% of state GDP (Government of Bihar Finance Department, 2015). There are 10,432,417
land holdings in the state, of which 82.9% are less than one hectare. Another 9.6% are between one and two
hectares (BAMETI, 2015). Only 1.8% of land holdings are greater than four hectares. In our sample, the
mean landholding was 0.879 ha, of which 0.577 ha were planted in grains.
The supply chain of Bihar is outlined in figure 9.2. Farmers plant, tend, and harvest grains themselves.
Harvest is conducted mechanically as well as manually; 96.12% of our sample has harvested mechnically.
Grain is then threshed and dried on farm. I find that 99.38% of households dry their grains using sun drying;
24.97% have also laid grain on a tarpaulin sheet to dry them, but none of our sample had used a solar or
diesel dryer. Households store grain on farm at least temporarily, during which time it is most likely to be
stored in jute bags without plastic liners (72.92%), although 21.13% of households include plastic liners and
24.22% also place pesticide directly in the jute bag. No households have used a moisture meter to monitor
their crop’s moisture content (table 9.10).
Some households then sell at least a portion of their crop, while others continue to store grain in the
house or a shed until they consume it themselves. I find that only 18.22% of households sell grain in our
sample and 98.37% of households who sell grain store at least a portion of their grain. Households report
storing 57.54% of their wheat crop, 28.41% of maize, and 48.54% of rice. Own consumption is the most
common reason for grains to be stored (98%); only 33% of households store grain to obtain a better price
later in the season. These rates of storage and home consumption are consistent with the literature. The
DMI survey finds that 45% of paddy is kept on-farm for consumption in Bihar, and nationwide producers
keep 41.45% of maize and 39.67% of grain for on-farm consumption (Shroff & Kajale, 2013). Nanda et al.
report that 33% of paddy and 37% of wheat are retained by farmers for their own use (Nanda et al., 2012).
Although prices are higher outside of harvest, many farmers who commercialize grain sell their product
immediately after harvest, when prices are low. In my sample, 42.46% of wheat sales and 80.87% of maize
sales took place at harvest. Rice sales are more continuous throughout the year; only 23.05% took place
during the most recent harvest. Lack of access to storage is one cause; households on average have storage
capacity of 854.17 kg, but in the most recent harvest households in the sample sold 1326.16 kg of maize
alone on average. Lack of a buyer also limits sales, as 100% of wheat traders, 99% of maize traders, and
98.5% of rice traders only purchase intermittently throughout the year. Finally, households who have taken
out loans are expected to repay those loans at the time of harvest, as creditors are aware that the household
will have an increase in income. In our sample, 23.00% of households had standing loans at the time of the
survey, and 11.6% of households had out standing loans for agriculture.
Grains that are sold are commercialized through a local trader in the trader’s shop or through the trader
buying at the farmer’s field. Therefore, the owner of the grain is responsible for its transportation, be it
the farmer bringing it to the trader prior to sale, or the trader transporting it to storage post-sale. When
the owner transports the grain, there is no concern over moral hazard. Traders in Bihar are also financially
liable for any losses that occur after purchase, as they are then sole owners of the grain. In fact, traders go to
efforts to improve quality by hiring employees to pick out broken grains and foreign matter after purchase.
This practice can be viewed as a form of vertical integration. Rather than establishing an informal contract
(in the form of quality premia) with farmers for quality preservation, traders perform the action themselves.
It is likely less expensive to vertically integration because labor costs are low while the cost of coordination
is high, as binding contracts are difficult to establish in informal markets without regulatory agencies. The
results of a farmer’s efforts to improve quality may also have high variance in quality, which Hueth and Jano
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(2015) find reduces the compensation for quality.
Of households that do commercialize their grain, 60.41% report that they could not sell to another trader
for a better price (table 9.11). Reasons given for this are collusion among traders and a lack of other traders.
Data from the trader survey also shows that village traders in Bihar enjoy extreme levels of market power.
The sample has an average of 1.912 traders purchasing in each village, with a minimum of one trader and
a maximum of four. Even more remarkably, the average village Herfindahl (table 9.12) for each crop more
than doubles the benchmark the US Department of Justice considers to be highly concentrated, 0.25 out of
1.00 (US Department of Justice, 2015). Economic theory shows that quantity will be lower and prices will
be higher in monopoly and oligopoly settings compared to a perfectly competitive market. When buyers
have high market power (monopsony or oligopsony), both quantity price will be low. Intermediaries that act
as both a monopsonist buyer and a monopolist seller may have the ability to buy grain below competitive
equilibrium prices and sell it at high prices, garnering a large profit.
During sale traders do not adhere to formal quality standards that have been set forth by the government,
and anecdotally neither do local government buyers. Some communication of quality preferences still occurs,
however, as households and traders agree that moisture is one of the most important qualities for all three
crops and that grain size is important for wheat and rice. Opinions differ with regards to the second and
third most important qualities, however. Households also believe color is critical for wheat price and the
level of impurities is important for maize, while traders identify the number of broken grains as a key
determinant of wheat price and grain size as important for maize (table 9.7). This imperfect information
transfer prevents quality being produced at the level where marginal benefit of quality matches the marginal
cost of its production (Fafchamps, Hill, & Minten, 2008).
Traders store grain temporarily, although 85% of traders claim they would not make a higher profit if
they stored grain after harvest. This was not due to stagnant prices; 85% of traders agree that prices go up
after harvest. Rather, they need to sell immediately to repay farmers (92.7%) and report that storage costs
are too high (92.7%). When traders do store, they do so in jute bags (96% for maize, 96% for wheat, and
100% for rice) (table 9.13).
In our sample, traders sell to another trader (83%), a mill (22%), retail (28%), an animal feed producer
(17%), or directly to households (11%). Mechanical milling has been nearly universally adopted (99.4%),
which is likely due to the fact that milling is carried out by processors rather than farmers. After households
sell grain to a local trader the grain continues being sold to progressively larger traders until it reaches a
processor; grain sold to processors is then sold back to consumers.
Officially, the Food Corporation of India (FCI) procures grain from farmers at a Minimum Support Price
to reach its mission of stabilizing grain prices in the country so that farmers can sell at a sufficiently high
price while households purchase at a sufficiently low price. While the FCI is a federal entity and procurement
occurs nationwide, 97% of paddy and 87% of wheat procurement is carried out by state agencies (FCI, 2016;
FCI, 2016). As such, the system functions differently in each state. In Bihar, state procurement is carried
out by Primariy Agricultural Credit Societies (PACS), local societies of farmers. Notably, however, none
of the farmers in my sample sell to PACS. This is a nationwide phenomenon. Although small-holders are
supposed to be able to sell grain to federal or state procurement organizations, only 10% of paddy and 16.2%
of wheat farmers sold to a federal or state procurement agency between January and June 2013 (Rajawat,
2015).
Rajawat (2015) argues that shortage of government storage capacity makes it impossible for the govern-
ment to procure the entire harvest; the only people who can sell to government procurers at the time of
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harvest are those who have greased enough palms. Farmers in the sample say that local officials cite incom-
plete paperwork or poor quality as justification to refuse a sale. Farmers also complain that officials prefer
processing the paperwork of a few traders to that of dozens of farmers, and therefore impose an unofficial
minimum purchase quantity. Official policy also requires that farmers be reimbursed for transportation costs
to the PACS, but farmers report that is never paid. In contrast, 91% of traders report that they purchase
on-field, eliminating the need for farmers to transport grain. The FCI also has formal quality standards that
they can use to refuse sale (tables 9.5 and 9.6), although it unlikely those standards are used consistently.
Traders measure quality using their teeth and hands, and very few report refusing sale as their method of
penalizing low quality (7 wheat traders, 7 maize traders, and 1 rice trader from my sample of 107). Farmers
also report that local officials demand between 5 and 10 percent of the grain as extra payment, and that
payment from sales to PACS is delayed from two months to a year; traders pay within a month.
No traders in our sample report selling to PACS, however. One possible reason for this is that PACS
were established to work directly with farmers; traders may be reluctant to report violating this system by
selling to the government directly. Anecdotally, it is large traders who are selling to PACS, so traders in our
sample may be too small to sell to PACS. This anecdotal evidence implies that market power is necessary to
sell grain to the government for the established floor price, an irony given that the program was established
to ensure that all farmers could receive fair prices.
The ineffectiveness of this program with respect to its intended purpose is clearly demonstrated in Table
9.14, which finds that the Minimum Support Price (MSP) does not hold for any crops. The average price
which households received in the last harvest is at least 1.5 Rs. kg, or 11.03%, under the MSP, depending
on crop. The traders confirm this, as their average purchases prices are well under the MSP. Notably, the
average sale price of traders in our sample was also under the MSP, which supports the hypothesis that the
traders in the sample are too small to sell directly the PACS themselves.
The data also confirm that grain is typically passed between at least two intermediaries before it reaches
the end consumer. Since quality must be maintained during each stage of the supply chain to prevent losses
from compounding, each additional intermediary introduces another potential agency problem, leading to
possible careless or untrained handling.
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Chapter 5
Theoretical Model for Quality
Premium
I model a setting with a large number of farmers, each who produce a fixed quantity of grain (determined,
say, by their farm size). Grain is purchased by n local traders who then sell the grain to local end users. All
sales take place within the same market. Each individual farmer can directly choose the quality level φ(p)
per unit of grain, where φ(p) is ordinal, and a higher value of φ(p) represents higher grain quality. Quality
is a function of price that is determined by the end user’s demand function for quality.
Producing φ(p) incurs a marginal cost c for the farmer. The trader pays the farmer βpφ(p) per unit of
grain, where p is the marginal value of quality that the trader receives when he resells the grain. The portion
of the price that is passed on to the farmer is represented by β ∈ (0, 1). The farmer’s per unit profit takes
the form
pif = [βpφ(p)− cφ(p)]. (5.1)
Maximizing this with respect to quality, I find that the farmer produces quality at such a level as
βp = c, (5.2)
In other words, the farmer produces at the point that marginal revenue of quality is equal to the marginal
cost of quality.
The n traders have the ability to differentiate their product, giving them a degree of power to set their
price. The trader faces a final demand for quality:
φd(pi) = S ∗ ( 1
n
− b(pi − p¯)) (5.3)
where S is the preference for quality in the market. End users that need a higher quality grain to produce
their product, such as millers, will have a higher value of S and a higher quality demanded, φd than a feed
producer whose product does not depend on quality. As stated above, n is the number of traders buying
and selling grain in the market.
The term b represents the trader’s ability to differentiate and set prices above market prices; a higher
value of b results in a larger decrease in quality demanded when pi strays above the prevailing market price,
p¯. Imagine a setting with only high and low levels of quality, φdh and φdl and a trader setting the equilibrium
price for high quality grain (determined by the levels of S, n, b, and p¯). If the trader wishes to set price
above his current level, he will no longer face demand for high quality grain, and will instead face demand
for low quality grain by end-users. To increase price while still selling high quality grain, he must also lower
b, his sensitivity to market price. This can be achieved by differentiating his services from the other n − 1
traders in the market by changing the location or timing of his delivery. Traders which differentiate their
product can set a higher price pi while still selling the same quality of grain.
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Given this, the trader will choose pi and β that maximize profit.
pit = piφd(pi)− βipiφs(pi)− F (5.4)
where F is a fixed cost of operation such as shop rent or employing assistants. The quality of grain that
end users demand is represented by φd, and φs represents the quality of grain the trader buys from farmers.
For the trader to successfully sell his grain, the quality he buys from the farmer must be of greater or equal
than the quality demanded by the end user. For the sake of simplicity I assume that traders cannot change
quality. I therefore assume that the trader will set pi such that φs = φd, as this maximizes profit. Two
practices in Bihar may violate this assumption. First, traders in Bihar practice grain mixing, which makes
it possible that φs 6= φd for small quantities, but it must be true that φ¯s = φ¯d for the trader to mix the grain
to achieve φd. The practice of traders hiring workers to manually improve quality, as discussed in section
4.2, is more problematic. I discuss the implications of that violation in the results section.
For the model, however, I maintain the assumption that φs = φd, which allows me to rewrite trader
profit with respect to quality as
pit = (1− βi)φ(pi) ∗ pi − F (5.5)
Substituting in the final demand function, I find
pit = S
( 1
n
− (pi − p¯)
)
(1− βi)pi − F. (5.6)
The trader then chooses pi and β that maximizes profit. The first order conditions are:
∂pit
∂pi
= (1− βi)
(
φi(pi) + p
∂φ
∂p
)
= 0 (5.7)
∂pit
∂βi
= pi
∂φi
∂βi
− βipi ∂φi
∂βi
− piφi = 0 (5.8)
Plugging equation 5.3 into equation 5.7 yields
∂pit
∂pi
= (1− βi)
(
S
( 1
n
− 2bpi + bp¯
)− −pbS
n
)
= 0 (5.9)
Solving for price I find
p∗i =
1
bn
+
1
bn2
+
p¯
n
+ p¯. (5.10)
Similarly, plugging equation 5.3 into 5.8 shows
∂pit
∂βi
= (1− β)∂φi
∂βi
− S
(
1
n
− b(pi + p¯)
)
= 0 (5.11)
I solve this for βi, which yields
β∗i = 1−
−S( 1n − b(pi − p¯))
∂φi
∂βi
(5.12)
From equation 5.10, a trader will increase his price if the average market price increases. The FOC also
show that pi decreases when the number of traders in the market n increases. Pi decreases as the trader
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becomes more sensitive to the prevailing market price, or b increases. Although traders sell their product for
a lower price when the number of competitors increases, I find that the share of the price that is passed on
to the farmers, β, is increasing in n. This implies that traders must compete to purchase grain from farmers
when there are more traders in the market. Equation 5.12 also indicates that β is increasing in b. As traders
become less differentiated, the share price they pay to farmers increases.
To assess the effect of the number of traders on quality, I assume that quality is increasing in compen-
sation, or ∂φ(p)∂βp > 0. Because β is increasing in n but p is decreasing in n, the overall effect of a change in
the number of traders on the compensation a farmer receives is ambiguous. The effect of a change in the
number of traders on the quality produced cannot be determined without imposing more structure on φ(p)
and β. When | ∂p∂n | is greater than |∂β∂n |, or an increase in n results in a decrease in the price that is higher in
magnitude than the increase in the pass-through to the farmer, quality will decrease, and vice versa.
Similarly, the effect of trader differentiation on the price farmers receive, βp, is ambiguous. Traders
who are not sensitive to the average market price, p¯, will receive a higher price, pi, but they will also pass
less of that price on to farmers through β. Again, the net effect depends on the magnitudes of the partial
derivatives. When |∂p∂b | is greater than |∂β∂b |, the effect of the increase in price that a trader receives will
dominate the decrease in pass-through, and the farmer will net gain.
In the following section I test the results of this model in practice by modeling the purchase effect of
village and regional market power and differentiation traders’ price and premia.
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Chapter 6
Method
I develop several testable hypotheses from the theoretical model of the effect of market power on grain
quality premia. First, I hypothesize that grain intermediaries with higher market power are able to simulta-
neously offer lower quality premia to farmers and receive high premia from end users. Second, I hypothesize
that traders who differentiate themselves so that households are unable to sell to another trader are able to
pay lower prices to households beyond the level expected given their market power. I test these hypotheses
using primary data from Brazil and India. Given that these hypotheses involves two transactions and three
actors, the analysis includes several methods.
6.1 Premia Schedules
First, the quality premia used in Brazil are explicitly stated in price schedules, so I report them as the
cooperatives provided them to me. I use them as a benchmark for quality premia in a formal market with
low market power by intermediaries and (almost) complete information regarding quality throughout the
entire supply chain. I also compare them to the premia established by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
standards. This numerical comparison will be supported by qualitative information on the method by which
cooperatives set prices. I will use the comparison between premia in Parana´ and Chicago to evaluate the
extent to which quality premia are being transferred from end user to small-holder farmers.
6.2 Trader Models
The pricing decisions of traders in Bihar are modeled using a linear regression with village fixed effects
model. I use the following form to model a trader’s purchase price and purchase discount:
Pijc = β0c + β1cMPijc + β2cBij + β3cRij + β4cTijc + Vjc + ijc. (6.1)
Here the subscript i refers to an individual trader, j refers to the village in which he operates, and c
refers to the crop the model represents. I estimate the model separately for wheat, maize, and rice. The
market share of trader i in village j is written MPijc. It is calculated as (
V olumei
V olumej
)2, the square of the
volume of trader i as a proportion of the total volume in village j. The type of client the trader buys grain
from and sells grain to are represented by sets of indicator variables, Bij and Rij , respectively. A vector of
demographic variables for the trader, Tij , includes their years working as a trader and indicator variables
for high caste traders and those with secondary education. The village fixed effects term is Vjc, and ijc is
the standard random error term.
To model the price at which the trader sells grain I use a similar village fixed effects model, but I omit
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the village market power term and include the number of villages in which the trader buys grain. Unlike
in the theoretical model where purchases and sales took place in one market, traders may purchase grain
in a small village and resell it at a larger market. Therefore, I want to control for regional market power
in a model of sale price rather than village market power, MPijc. However, I am constrained from using
exploicit regional market power measures since I only observe a sample of traders in the region. The vector
of trader attributes, Tij , as well as the type of clients the trader buys from and sells to, Rij and Bij , are
representative of the trader’s power in the regional market. To understand the relationship between regional
and village market power measures I estimate
MPij = γ0 + γ1Bij + γ2Rij + γ3Tij + Vj + Cij + ij . (6.2)
For this model, I pool all observations and control for the crop the market power corresponds with using
indicator variables Cij .
6.3 Household Models
6.3.1 Main Results
For the primary household model, I follow the method of Hueth and Jano (2014), Kariuki, Loy, and Herzefeld
(2012), and Kadjo, Ricker-Gilbert, and Alexander (2015). I estimate the price of grain as a function of
quality parameters as well as characteristics of the buyer and seller. This type of model is an extension of
the traditional hedonic price model, which Rosen introduced in 1974 (Rosen, 1974). Rosen’s original model
represents a good as a bundle of attributes, whose respective prices compose the total price of the good. The
coefficients of the model represent the implicit price of each individual attribute. The model takes the form
P = α0 + α1φ1 + α2φ2 + ...+ αnφn + , (6.3)
where φ1, ..., φn represent the quality level of n quality attributes and α1, ..., αn are the marginal values of
those attributes.
For this equation to provide an unbiased estimate of price, Rosen made two assumptions that do not
hold in India. First, Rosen assumes that buyers and sellers are perfectly matched. As previously shown,
farmers in Bihar are limited in their choice of buyer due to the limited number of traders in each village,
collusion among traders, difficulty accessing large markets, and minimum purchase quantities imposed by
larger intermediaries. Second, there must be full transfer of information regarding desired quality attributes.
This allows producers to tailor their goods to meet the demands of consumers. I find that some information
transfer occurs in Bihar despite the lack of formal quality standards, but there is still difference of opinion
between households and traders regarding qualities that most determine price (Table 9.7).
To control for the first violation I include the village market share of the trader the household sold to in
the most recent harvest and an indicator variable for whether the household reported it could sell to another
trader. These account for the trader’s market power and price setting ability in the village as well as in
their relationship with that particular household. Since the theoretical model represents price as a function
of quality per unit of grain, I control for quantity.
The model takes the form
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Pikc = ω0c + ω1cφkc + ω2cMPic + ω3cSk + ω4cNic +  (6.4)
where the subscript represents observations of household k selling crop c to trader i. The model is
estimated separately for each grain, as the desired qualities and practices vary by grain. The quality of the
grain, φkc, is measured by a set of self-reported indicator variablesthat signify whether the farmer states that
they have better or worse quality than their neighbors. The trader’s village market power, MPic, is measured
using the same method as in equation 6.1. The indicator variable Sk takes the value of 1 if household k
could not sell grain to another trader. The variable Nkc controls for the quantity sold, so that ω1c is a per
unit premium for quality.
In a full specification model, I include a set of indicator variables for the month of sale, as households
report that prices vary throughout the season. The inclusion of the proportion of the farmer’s income that
comes from non-farm activities accounts for the farmer’s reliance on the grain sale, and thereby their trader,
for their livelihood. The total area that a household owns represents the household’s wealth. Finally, I include
the standard demographic variables, household head age, gender, and education level. The household head’s
education and age as well as their involvement in agriculture, measured as the size of their land holding
and the proportion of income coming from agriculture, control for their likelihood of receiving information
regarding quality.
The full model is structured as follows:
Pikc = ω0c + ω1cφkc + ω2cMPic + ω3cSk + ω4cNic + ω5cHk + ω6cTikc + . (6.5)
The subscripts and variables are the same as equation 6.4. The variable Hk is a vector of household
demographic variables, including the age, gender and education of the household head, landholding size,
farming as a proportion of total income, and whether the household has an outstanding loan; and Tikc is a
vector of month indicator variables that denote the time the sale took place. Again, I estimate the model
separately for each crop.
While the previous models demonstrate that traders with high market power pay lower prices overall,
they do not specifically address the effect of village market power on quality premia. To answer this question,
I include an interaction term between quality and village market power for each quality, l one at a time. The
model mimics the form of equation 6.4, but rather than including the full vector φ, I include one quality,
and the interaction term between that quality and village market power. Due to limitation of sample size, I
estimate the model for each quality separately, so each crop has five models with the form
Pc = ω0cl + ω1clφikcl + ω2iclMPic + ω3cl(φikcl ∗MPic) + . (6.6)
6.3.2 Robustness Measures
I additionally estimate equation 6.4 using an alternative specification for φkc. Farmers were asked to
compare their grain quality to their neighbors’ as well as to the quality they produced in the previous harvest.
One might be concerned that farmers overstate their quality compared to their neighbor, whereas they would
not be as compelled to boast when comparing to their own quality. For robustness, I re-estimate the model
using the comparison to the past harvest in place of the comparison to the neighbor. I also validate the
results by using block fixed effects, which includes a constant term for each block (containing eight villages),
B in equations 6.4 and 6.5.
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For robustness, I also test whether there are clusters of poor quality in regions of the sample. These
clusters of poor quality grain could attract traders which are systematically different from the sample. For
example, low quality regions might only traders with high enough market power to hire labor to improve
grain quality or mix grain manually; low quality regions would then have fewer traders with inherently higher
market power. To investigate this relationship, I estimate the average Herfindahl in a block and tabulate the
instances of low, medium, and high quality in that village. I use the χ2 value to test whether the distribution
of grain quality is statistically significant between blocks using both measures of grain quality.
6.3.3 Secondary Analyses
To understand whether quality incentives are sufficient to encourage farmers to adopt quality-augmenting
technologies and whether these technologies do indeed improve quality, I compare the quality outcomes of
households who do and do not use technologies which are not universally adopted: a sheet during solar
drying, manual harvesting, a lined bag during storage, and pesticide during storage. Again, I use the χ2
value to test whether households who use the technologies have statistically different grain quality than those
who do not.
Further, I estimate mean price received by households that do and do not use all of the surveyed tech-
nologies. I then estimate the price a household receives as a function of non-universally adopted technologies.
In this model, technology, τ , is used as a measure of grain quality, and signals quality to traders (Hueth &
Jano, 2015). I also include market power in a second model, which is structured similarly to equation 6.4.
Pikc = ω0c + ω1cτkc + ω2cMPic + ω3cSk + ω4cNic +  (6.7)
The effect of selling on-farm on price is not immediately clear; traders usually charge a premium if they
must travel to the farm, but they are better able to identify the steps a farmer took to improve quality
(Hueth & Jano, 2015). Furthermore, the sale must hold a degree of importance to the trader to compel
them to travel to the farm for the sale. This places more of the power in the hands of the farmer than one
would find in a typical off-farm sale. First, I include an indicator variable for whether or not a household
sold on-farm in the hedonic model with market power, equation 6.4. This will demonstrate whether location
results in a premium or a discount once quality is controlled for. I also estimate equation 6.7 separately
for households who sold on-farm and those who did not to discern whether traders are more responsive to
technology usage when they are able to identify it on-farm at the time of sale.
Finally, the traders in the sample are heterogeneous in terms of who they can sell to. Less than 30% of
the sample sells to a mill, a retailer, or a feed producer, whereas 83% sell to another trader. Traders which
sell directly to end-users are subject to more rigorous quality measurements, and may offer different prices
and premia to the households they buy from. I first estimate the price a household receives as a function
of the type of they sell to (sells directly to end-users or only sells to traders); next I control for the grain
quality, and finally I also include market power in the model. The final model takes the form:
Pikc = ω0c + ω1cφkc + ω2cMPic + ω3cSk + ω4cNic + ω5cLic + . (6.8)
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Chapter 7
Results
7.1 Premia Schedules
First, I examine the quality premia (discounts) used by cooperatives in Parana´. In Parana´, discounts
are taken as a percent of weight; if a farmer brings 100 kg of corn and received a five percent quality discount,
he is entitled to sell 95 kg at the standard price. Cooperative leaders report setting discounts to match their
neighbors, which is evidenced by two major cooperatives using identical pricing schedules for corn and very
similar schedules for soy. Additionally, both cooperative leaders and farmers state that the daily base price
is based on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and exchange rates. This evidence suggests that prices and
discounts are not driven by market power, as intermediaries in Parana´ are subject to a saturation of the
market and must adhere to global commodity prices, which farmers monitor very closely.
Tables 9.15 and 9.16 outline the specific rates at which maize, soybeans, and wheat are discounted for
various moisture levels and percentages of broken grain. Foreign matter is not included in a table, as it is
discounted exactly per its weight for both corn and soy; a 1% increase in foreign matter will result in a 1%
reduction in price at all levels. The tables show a consistent 1.5% price reduction per additional percent
moisture in corn and between a 1.3 and 1.5% discount for soy based on the level and cooperative. The
discount for broken grain increases as the level increases; when broken grains account for between 6 and
11% of the total weight, an additional percent of broken grains will only result in a 1% discount, but that
increases to a 4% discount when broken grains account for between 16 and 20% of the total weight.
Quality traits that affect physical losses, such as moisture content and foreign matter, are paramount
to determining grade and thereby the value of the grain on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Based on
average 2015 prices (USDA, 2016), a 2% increase in broken grains for wheat which resulted in the grain
being downgraded to grade 2 would decrease price 0.71% per bushel, while a 0.3% increase in foreign matter
would also decrease price 0.71% per bushel. A 2% increase in broken grains or a 1% increase in foreign
matter decreases corn price 0.42% per bushel. For soy, a 1% increase in foreign matter or a 1% increase in
broken grains both result in a 0.68% decrease in soybean price per bushel.
Since international buyers have strict standards and discounts for broken grains and foreign matter, they
are strictly measured and used to determine price in Parana´. The discounts imposed by cooperatives in
Parana´ are slightly larger in magnitude than those I estimate based on US grading standards, discounts, and
2015 prices, but are generally comparable. This slight difference may be because grains are likely to acquire
more damage during processing and transportation to the United States, so cooperatives must ensure that
quality is well within acceptable margins when farmers deposit it. It is clear, however, that with full transfer
of information and incentives, intermediaries incentivize the production of qualities that the end users value.
Intermediaries in Parana´ also neglect qualities for which end users do not compensate: color and size.
The USDA grading standards (tables 9.2, 9.3, 9.4) make little mention of either color or size, and these are
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the grades that matter for companies operating on the international market.
According to the theoretical model, traders will pass a larger share of the premia they receive on to farmers
as n increases. That appears to be the case in Parana´, where the market for cooperatives is competitive.
They receive between a 0.5 and 2% discount from end users for a 1% increase in foreign matter or broken
grains, depending on the crop. Similarly, cooperatives administer around a 1% discount for a 1% increase in
foreign matter and broken grains at low levels impurity. As predicted, premia are passed through the supply
chain when there are many intermediaries who are relatively undifferentiated.
7.2 Trader Models
To compare the behavior of intermediaries in Parana´ and Bihar, I model the average price a trader paid
farmers in Bihar’s most recent harvest using equation 6.1 and data from the trader survey. The results of the
three regressions are found in table 9.17. The coefficient on village market power is negative and significant
for wheat and rice, although it is positive and insignificant for maize. Holding all else equal, wheat and rice
traders with higher market power in a village paid a lower average price for grain last harvest. Traders who
bought grain from other traders, and can be viewed as a level higher on the supply chain, paid a higher
price for all three crops. This confirms that the price of grain rises at each stage of the supply chain and
households, the lowest level of the supply chain, receive the lowest price for grain.
In addition to average price, traders were asked the average discount they took off if grain was of poor
quality. I regress the same set of variables on this discount, and the results are shown in table 9.17. For all
crops, higher village market power decreases the discount a trader gave; this result is significant for wheat
and maize. The combination of the two sets of models suggests that trades with high village market power
pay a low fixed price that does not vary with quality.
In Parana´ I find that intermediaries incentivize quality because they are themselves incentivized for high
quality when they sell on the international market. To examine whether traders in Bihar are similarly
incentivized to sell high quality grain, I model the price that a trader receives when he sells the grain. As
stated previously, regional market power is measured by the number of villages a trader operates in, who
the trader buys grain from, who they sell to, their education level, their caste, and their years of trading
experience. In terms of quality, traders with low regional market power are likely to sell grain to another
trader regardless of quality; this is the base category that I omit from the model. I expect that traders with
regional market power sell higher quality grain to retailers and millers and sell low quality grain for animal
feed. Indicator variables representing the end user therefore serve as interaction terms between market power
and quality. The results of this model, as well as the model predicting a trader’s village market power as a
function of these same variables, are found in table 9.18.
While the significance of individual coefficients varies by crop, the following conclusions can be made
given the overall sign and significance of the three models. The price that a trader receives increases with
the number of villages in which the trader purchases, his education level, the number of years he has been
trading, and his caste. All of these coefficients suggest that a trader’s market power increases the price he
receives
Price is higher for traders that sell to retailers and mills (significant for wheat and marginally significant
for rice), while it is lower for traders who sell to animal feed producers (significant for wheat and marginally
significant for maize and rice). This is evidence that certain traders have the ability to price discriminate,
although this is only true for more powerful traders in the sample. Traders can obtain quality premia by
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differentiating the end users to whom they sell grain, but there seems to be a relationship between a trader’s
market power and their ability to receive premia.
7.3 Household Models
7.3.1 Main Results
Next, I use the household data to confirm whether traders with high market power price grain differently
than those with low market power. To demonstrate the effect of omitting market power from the hedonic
model, I estimate a standard hedonic model (equation 6.3). I then reestimate the hedonic model with a
control for the trader’s village market share and whether the household felt they could sell to another trader.
Table 6.5 presents the results. Once MPjk, the same village market share term as used in the trader model,
and Sk, the household’s ability to sell to another trader are included, the coefficients on quality change (table
9.19). I will analyze the meaning of these quality premia in depth later in this section.
Importantly, both MPic and Sk have negative and significant coefficients, with the exception of the coef-
ficients of market power for maize and wheat which is negative but insignificant. Notably, these coefficients
are significant in alternative specification of the model, which I will discuss in later sections. If a trader’s
village market power increases or the household loses the ability to sell to another trader, the price they
receive per unit of grain will decrease, all else equal. Relating this to the theoretical model, the negative
terms suggest that |∂β∂n | is greater than |∂pi∂n |, causing the overall price the farmer receives to decrease as their
trader’s market power increases.
Using equation 6.6, I estimate the effect of market power on the premium received by a farmer by
reporting the main effect of the quality premium and the interaction term of quality and market power.
While a number of quality premia in table 9.19 using equation 6.4 are significant, I find that the interaction
term of quality and market power works in the opposite direction of the quality premium in every case where
the premium is significant. Moreover, the main effect and market power interaction have opposite sign in
twenty-seven out of thirty cases, and they only take the same sign when the premia are already small and
insignificant. Farmers selling to high market power traders, therefore face a very unchanging price schedule,
and have little incentive to produce high quality grain.
Translating these results into monetary terms, I use equation 6.4 to estimate the average price for a
household who is stuck with their trader and a household who is able to seek a different trader, holding all
else constant. Households who are able to seek another trader sell to traders with market shares of 0.54 for
wheat, 0.55 for maize, and 0.67 for rice, on average. In contrast, households who are stuck with their trader
on average face traders with much lower market shares of 0.53 for wheat, 0.47 for maize, and 0.51 for rice.
Holding quality and household characteristics equal, a household who is stuck with their trader receives 0.64
fewer Rs. per kg of wheat, 0.90 fewer Rs. per kg of maize, and 0.12 fewer Rs. per kg of rice. In practical
terms, the prices a household who is stuck with their trader receives are 4.94% lower for wheat, 5.57% lower
for maize, and 1.20% lower for rice.
A household who sells to a monopsonist trader (MP = 1.00) compared to a household who sells to a
trader with a competitive market share according to the US Department of Justice (MP = 0.25) will receive
0.15Rs./kg less for wheat, 0.36Rs./kg less for maize, and 0.22Rs./kg less for rice. At the sample average
quantities, this translates to a total loss of income of 54.86Rs. for wheat, 477.42Rs. for maize, and 98.49Rs.
for rice.
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The household models support the conclusion that traders with high village market power buy grain for
low and unvarying prices. When village and regional market power overlap, a trader may be able to buy at
a low price and sell for a high price, making a much larger profit than he would in the absence of market
power. In other cases, small traders with local market power purchase from households at a low price and
sell to a larger trader for a higher price. This larger trader has regional market power, and is able to sell
grain for an even higher price. This long supply chain results in a large disparity between the price and
incentives the farmer receives and the price and incentives the end user gives, and it is driven by market
power.
7.3.2 Robustness Measures
Table 9.20 reports the results of the robustness checks for the household model. The coefficients on
village market power and the stuck indicator variable are negative with varying levels of siginficance for
all crops using the hedonic model with full household controls (column 1) and the hedonic model using
comparison to previous quality (column 4). The coefficients in the block fixed effects models are smaller
in magnitude, particularly for maize and rice, where they are close to zero. Market concentration may be
similar within a block, making the control on market share less predictive.
These results, which point to high power traders in Bihar receiving incentives for high quality grain but
those incentives never reaching households, seem at odds with the predictions of Fafchamps and evidence
from Parana´. Fafchamps predicts that quality premia in a competitive market will settle at the level where
the marginal utility of the quality is equal to the marginal cost of producing that quality. High power traders
in Bihar, however, may be under-compensating farmers for quality by paying less than the marginal utility
(or the premia traders receive when they sell the grain). It is therefore important to understand whether
grain quality is suffering as a result of market power or whether farmers continue to produce high quality
grain regardless.
Table 9.22 reports the average village market power of the traders households sell to by the quality of
their crop. It suggests that for qualities that can be altered after harvest, impurities, broken grains, and
moisture content, households who produce low quality grain sell to high power traders. This pattern is not
present for color or size. First, households have little control over grain color or size post-harvest, so whether
a household produces grain with good color or quality is less influenced by incentives. Second, traders are
also not able to alter color or size after the sale takes place.
Given preliminary evidence that high power traders receive lower grain quality, offering such low premia
seems to be an irrational behavior, as traders themselves receive higher prices for higher quality grain. In
practice, however, traders are able to improve grain quality after sale. When traders have high market power,
they are able to purchase grain at such low prices that the marginal cost of improving quality themselves
is lower than the premia necessary to motivate farmers to improve quality. Lower power traders must offer
competitive prices and premia to complete sales. The marginal cost of motivating farmers to produce high
quality grain is in effect lower, as the trader would not be able to make a sale without offering a premium.
Therefore it is less costly to buy high quality grain from households than to manually improve quality.
Households who are offered premia respond by producing higher quality grain. When traders are unable to
change quality after purchase (as is the case for color and size), however, market power has no effect on the
quality households produce.
Some grain quality may be recovered manually by traders, but the trader never returns the grain to its
full potential quality. The trader combats high percentages of broken or damaged grains by discarding the
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individual grains; that physical loss would not have occurred had farmers prevented quality from deteriorating
to begin with. The household knows they will receive the same compensation whether they sell 100kg of
perfect grains or grain of which 10kg must be thrown away. They therefore do not take action to prevent
breakage during threshing or pest infestation that damages grain further. They may not dry the grain
properly, and while the grain remains at high moisture content for longer than necessary, it can acquire must
or mold that requires it to be discarded.
To test the robustness of the relationship between market power and quality premia, I test spatial
clustering of quality. Many traders may choose not to operate in low quality regions, driving up the market
power in regions with historically low quality grain. Tables 9.23 through 9.28 show that χ2 tests fail to
reject the null hypothesis of different quality by block for all quality dimensions for all grains using quality
comparisons to one’s neighbors’ and the most recent harvest. I then ask whether these differences in quality
are related to market power in the region. Does high regional market concentration lead to low regional grain
quality? I report the Herfindahl in each block along with the quality outcomes, and find that in some cases
blocks with high market concentration also report many of the poor quality outcomes. However, patterns
are inconsistent based on whether the farmer is comparing their grain quality to their neighbor’s grain or
their own previous harvest. Generally, farmers are more likely to report higher quality compared to their
own previous harvest, which has interesting implications on the accuracy of self-reported measures. Both
measures are imperfect because in both cases the grain against which farmers are comparing their current
harvest was produced in the same block and would be subject to the same block clustering of quality. Spatial
patterns of quality and quality reporting should be investigated further in future studies.
7.3.3 Secondary Analyses
The disconnect between quality and prices is may be caused by the available technology. The relationship
between adoption of sheet drying, manual threshing, lined gunny sacks, and pesticide tablets in storage is
not obvious. Tables 9.29, 9.30, and 9.31 find that technology use is significant in twenty-one out of thirty-six
tests, but no obvious or intuitive pattern emerges. Significance levels vary across crops, and in some cases
the effect of technology is opposite what one would expect. For example, households who lay their grain on
a sheet before drying, an additional measure which would be expected to protect the grain from insects and
foreign matter on the ground, are less likely to report low levels of moisture or impurities of grain.
The nebulous results of technology ”improvements” may be another reason that traders are less likely
to enter informal contracts with farmers. Tables 9.32 and 9.33, which estimate the price received by the
full sample based on the technology used during and after harvest, confirm that farmers are almost never
compensated for technology. The exception to this result is pesticide usage, as the reduction of insects in
grain bags can be easily detected and compensated.
If technology use alone is not a strong signal of grain quality (although proper use of technology may
improve quality), then traders are still left without a simple predictor or measure of grain quality. Rather
than investing in technology to accurately predict quality, they choose to employ low-wage labor to improve
quality post-sale.
Sale location is also related to both price and market power; I also investigate it as an explanation for
the lack of compensation for quality. Sales which take place on-field are significantly larger in quantity than
those which take place in a trader’s shop. Traders are willing to travel for an important client with large
amounts of grain. These large clients receive significantly higher prices of wheat and rice, holding quality
constant. For maize, the effect is opposite, and on-field sales receive a statistically lower price (table 9.35).
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For wheat and rice, and very small percentage of the sample sells grain on-field, whereas half of maize sales
take place on-field (table 9.11). Wheat and rice producers which sell on-field are important enough that
traders pay a premium for the grain, even after building the cost of transportation into the purchase price.
For maize, however, traders lower price to cover their own transportation costs without offering farmers,
who are not particularly remarkable, a premium.
When I split the sample into sales which take place on and off-field, pesticide usage is only significant
in sales taking place off-field, as the pesticide is more useful the longer the grain remains in storage, and
on-field sales are likely immediately after harvest. Laying grain on a sheet also significantly increases the
price of wheat which is sold on-field, although it decreases price when rice is sold off-field, holding all else
equal. As discussed previously, use of a sheet does not improve grain quality as one might expect, and may
in fact decrease quality. The discrepancy between the two results may be due to the fact that traders react
to the signal of improved technology usage when sales take place on-field, but when observing grain apart
from the technology the effect of the sheet on quality is so bad that it actually decreases total price.
It may also be that traders in the sample lack the regional market power to receive quality premia
themselves. Just as it is increasingly difficult to maintain quality as the number of actors handling the grain
increases, incentives can become diluted with each transaction. In the theoretical model, an intermediary
only passes β of the premia he receives on to farmers. If the trader instead sells the grain to another trader,
who then passes δ ∈ (0, 1) of the price he received, βp, on to a farmer, the farmer only receives δβp. As the
number of sales taking place before the grain reaches the end user becomes infinitely large, the premia the
households receive goes to zero. In practice, I find that the premia become statistically indistinguishable
from zero far with only a three or four traders, far before the number of traders reaches infinity.
The sample contains both traders who purchase directly from households and those who purchase from
other traders, allowing me to identify that traders can obtain premia by selling to differentiated end users.
Households, for the most part, sell to the lowest level traders, who are themselves receiving only a portion of
the premia. Therefore, each trader in the supply chain is behaving rationally by passing on a portion of the
premia he received, but at the end of the supply chain, the premia the households receive are insignificant.
I expect that, as the incentives to preserve quality are lost with each transaction, so is quality itself.
Households who sell to traders who sell directly to mills and retailers will receive a lower price overall,
holding quality equal (table 9.37). This is because traders which sell to end users directly have higher market
power, which is shown to decrease overall price. For wheat, where the effect of selling to a mill or retailer is
the strongest, the coefficient on market power is insignificant, whereas the coefficient on selling to a mill or
retailer is insignificant for rice but market power is significant.
The relationship between who the trader sells to and household price should be further developed. The
current survey of traders does not distinguish who a trader sells to separately for each grain. Therefore, a
traderr may have a value of one in the wheat for the variable indicating that they sell to feed producers,
when in fact that trader only sells their maize to feed producers. This increases the risk that the end-
user indicator variables are merely reflecting the trader’s market power. In addition to overall price, the
relationship between the seller a trader sells to and the premia a household receives should also be explored.
To avoid splitting the sample even further, I leave this relationship to further work.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Reducing post-harvest loss is crucial to the effort to achieve global food security, but the causes of
those post-harvest losses must be addressed. Farmers and intermediaries must be incentivized to prevent
physical and quality losses, as the two are inextricably related. The structure of the supply chain determines
whether actors are properly incentivized. High buyer or seller market power in grain markets and poor
communication of quality standards prevent a market from reaching optimal levels of quality and premia.
Farmers in Parana´ are able to sell to multiple intermediaries, and the quality preferences and premia of
each intermediary are clearly understood. Because the quality preferences and premia of the end user are
also well established, incentives, in the form of quality discounts, are passed through the supply chain all
the way from end users to local farmers. The qualities which are incentivized - moisture content and the
proportion of broken grains and impurities - are critical in preventing physical losses.
In Bihar, farmers face traders with high market power, and in many cases cannot sell to another trader.
Traders with high regional power are able to pay households low prices as well as low quality premia. More
often, however, multiple intermediaries handle the grain, and each exerts market power by passing only a
portion, β, of the price they receive on to the sellers. By the time premia reach households, they are no
longer significant. Preferences of traders and end users are not clearly communicated with households, which
drives the quality premia further from the equilibrium level, where the marginal value of quality equals its
marginal cost. This problem is only exacerbated as the number of transactions increases, as in a game of
telephone for grain quality. Households who sell to high power traders produce lower quality grain.
Traders may prefer to improve quality manually by discarding broken grains and impurities because the
effect of technology on quality is inconsistent in Bihar. As a result, the premium for adopting technology
such as drying grain on a sheet rather than on the ground is statistically insignificant. For traders, the least
costly method of ensuring their grain is of high quality is hire low-wage workers and improve grain quality
themselves. This causes higher post-harvest losses, as the grain that traders discard could have been saved
had farmers been compensated to maintain grain quality before problems occurred. Additionally, farmers
are not incentivized to adopt technology which could improve grain quality when used properly. This result
is critical for introduction of technology, as the market is currently structured such that farmers may be
hesitant to adopt new technology for fear they would not receive higher prices at harvest.
I find evidence that the effect of market power on price can be present for farmers as well as traders.
Farmers who sell large quantities of wheat and rice on-field receive a per-unit premium rather than penalty.
These grains are rarely sold on-field, so traders are only willing to travel to purchase on-field for farmers
who have a higher degree of market power. Since maize is frequently sold on-field, selling on-field is a weak
signal of the farmer’s market power, and farmers receive a penalty for selling on-field.
This thesis has a number of limitations. Future work should explicitly control for information transfer
and trust in the relationship between farmers and intermediaries in India. While traders were surveyed on
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their caste, households will not be surveyed regarding their caste until a future module. That could allow
me to include a term denoting whether the farmer and trader are from the same caste. I also wish to obtain
a more reliable measure of grain quality by observing the grain at time of sale or using pre-determined levels
of quality to elicit prices from traders. Finally, the spatial clustering of quality should be analyzed further.
Policies to reduce post-harvest loss could establish and publicize quality standards and encourage com-
petition among intermediaries. Where quality standards already exist, they could be hung in markets to
help hold traders accountable. The internet has fostered the dispensation of information regarding quality
standards and premia on international markets, and this system could be adopted to developing contexts
as well. Quality standards could be disseminated via text message; farmers who knew what their grain
was worth based on its quality could better negotiate prices with traders. Improving household access to
larger markets through transportation infrastructure improvement would allow househoolds to sell directly
to traders higher in the supply chain and prevent the loss of information and incentives throughout a long
and convoluted supply chain.
Where government grain programs exist, smallholder participation should be encouraged. Bihar has the
structure in place to combat high market power thanks to the Food Corporation of India. There are already
organizations across the country who are meant to purchase from farmers at fair prices. Bihar could remove
corrupt PACS officials or motivate officials to purchase from farmers. A disruption to the status quo would
force traders to compete to sell grain. Trader competition can also be increased by offering training or
education so that new traders could enter the market. Bihar’s concerted effort to end corruption in the
FCI’s work supplyinig grain to households lowered grain leakage in the state by 73% in only seven years
(Dreze & Khera, 2015); anti-corruption efforts in the procurement system could have similarly extraordinary
results.
High market power by grain intermediaries prevents farmers from being compensated for quality and tech-
nology adoption. The implications of these lack of incentives on grain quality on post-harvest loss outcomes
are troubling. When quality is incentivized throughout the supply chain, however, farmers, intermediaries,
and end users will ensure that grain is preserved. Efforts to reduce post-harvest loss are best served by
establishing supply chains where high quality grain is compensated financially at all levels. A reduction in
quality loss will lead to a reduction in post-harvest loss and an increase in the world’s available food supply.
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Chapter 9
Tables and Figures
Table 9.1: Post-Harvest Techniques and Causes of Loss
Stage Actors Methods Types of Loss
Harvest Farmer, contracted
labor
Combine harvester,
lathe
Harvesting outside opti-
mal time, breakage due to
improper technique, ani-
mals and pests when grain
left in field
Threshing Farmer, contracted
labor
Combine harvester,
manual thresher
Breakage or loss due to
improper technique
Drying Farmer, intermedi-
ary
Sun drying (In
Field), solar dryer,
fan dryer
Breakage (over-drying),
burning (fast drying),
damp grain (under-
drying)
Transport Farmer, contracted
labor
Truck, bicycle,
cart, intermediary
Falling out of vehicle
Storage Farmer, intermedi-
ary
Jute bag, plastic
bag, hermetic bag,
small metal silo,
large metal silo
Rotting/spoilage (damp
grain), pests/rodents,
disease
Processing Farmer, miller Processing losses
(Parfit, Barthel & Macnaughton, 2010)
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Table 9.2: USDA wheat grading standards*
Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CME premium per bushel $0.03 0.00 ($0.02)
Maximumum percent limits
Moisture 13.5 13.5
Heat Damaged Kernels 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0 3.0
Total Damaged Kernels 2.0 4.0 7.0 10.0 15.0
Foreign Matter 0.4 0.7 1.3 3.0 5.0
Broken Kernels 3.0 5.0 8.0 12.0 20.0
Wheat of other classes 1.0 2.0 3.0 10.0 10.0
Contrasting classes 3.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Stones 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
*Maximum count limits for animal filth, castor beans, etc. have been ommitted
Wheat that does not meet requirements of grades 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 or (1) has a musty, sour, or commercially objectionable 
foreign odor or is heating or is of distinctly low quality is considered U.S. Sample grade
(USDA, 2014)
Table 9.3: USDA corn grading standards
Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CME premium per bushel $0.015 0.00 ($0.02)
Maximum percent limits
Heat damaged kernels 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 3.0
Total damaged kernels 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 15.0
Broken grains and foreign material 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 7.0
Corn that does not meet requirements of grades 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 or (1) has a musty, sour, or commercially objectionable foreign 
odor or is heating (2) (1) contains stones with an aggregate weight in excess of 0.1% of sample, 2 or more pieces of glass, 3 or 
more crtalaria seeds, 2 or more castor beans, 4 or more particles of an unknown foreign substance or commonly recognized toxic 
or harmful substance, 8 or more cockleburs, similar seeds singly or in combination, animal filth in excess of 0.20% in 1,000g or 
(3) of distinctly low quality is considered U.S. Sample grade
(USDA, 1996)
Table 9.4: USDA soybean grading standards*
Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CME premium per bushel $0.06 0.00 ($0.06)
Maximum percent limits
Heat damaged kernels 0.3 0.5 1.0 3.0
Total damaged kernels 2.0 3.0 5.0 8.0
Foreign matter 1.0 2.0 3.0 5.0
Split grains 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0
Soybeans of other colors 1.0 2.0 5.0 10.0
*Maximum count limits for animal filth, castor beans, etc. have been ommitted
Soybeans that do not meet requirements of grades 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 or have a musty, sour, or commercially objectionable 
foreign odor or is heating or are of distinctly low quality are considered U.S. Sample grade
(USDA, 2007)
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Table 9.5: Food Corporation of India wheat grading standards
Grade I Grade II
Maximum percents
Moisture 12.0 12.0
Foreign Matter 0.75 0.75
Other foodgrains 3.0 2.0
Damaged grains 3.0 2.0
Slightly damaged 6.0 6.0
Shriveled broken 8.0 7.0
Table 9.6: Food Corporation of India rice grading standards
Grade A Raw Grade A Parboiled
Maximum percents P
Moisture content 14.0 14.0
Broken grains 25.0 16.0
Foreign matter 0.5 0.5
Damaged 2.0 4.0
Discolored grains 3.0 5.0
Chalky grains 5.0
Red grains 3.0 3.0
Admixture of lower class 10.0 0.0
Dehusked grains 12.0 12.0
Table 9.7: Desired attributes for maize, wheat, and rice of surveyed farmers and traders in Bihar
Wheat Maize Rice
Farmers Traders Farmers Traders Farmers Traders
Top Attribute Moisture Moisture Moisture Moisture Moisture Moisture
Second Attribute Size Broken Size Impurities Size Size
Third Attribute Color Size
Table 9.8: Previous post-harvest loss studies in India
Source Year Location Crop Households On-farm
losses
Definition of on-
farm activities
(% of total
production)
Indian Ministry 2002 India Paddy 15,000 2.72 harvest, threshing,
of Agriculture Maize 15,000 2.45 winnowing,
Wheat 15,000 1.79 on-farm transport,
on-farm storage
ICAR 2012 India Paddy 12,000 6.36 harvest, threshing,
Wheat 12,000 7.32 winnowing/cleaning,
2015 Paddy 12,400 4.67 drying, on-farm
Wheat 12,400 4.07 storage
Maize 12,400 3.90
Basavaraja et al. 2007 Karnataka Rice 100 3.82 harvest, threshing,
Wheat 100 3.28 cleaning, drying
Shroff and 2013 Maharashtra Maize 100 1.69 (<1 ha) harvest, threshing,
Kajale 2.00 (1-2ha) winnowing, storage
2.10 (2-4ha)
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Table 9.9: Summary statistics of farmers in Parana´, Brazil
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Proportion who sell wheat 0.704 0.465
Proportio who sell soy 0.963 0.192
Proportion who sell maize 0.926 0.267
Area planted in grains (ha) 165.967 279.759
Number of intermediaries farmer works with 2 0.92
Proportion who contract driver for harvest 0.333 0.48
Proportion who contract driver for transport to coop 0.481 0.509
Proportion who rent land to another farmer 0.148 0.362
Proportion who rent land from another farmer 0.296 0.465
N 27
Table 9.10: Usage rates of post-harvest technologies of surveyed households commercializing grain in Bihar
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Sun drying 0.983 0.13
Lay grain on sheet 0.278 0.448
Solar dryer 0.002 0.041
Diesel dryer 0.003 0.059
Manual threshing 0.616 0.487
Mechanical threshing 0.962 0.191
Mechanical milling 0.991 0.092
Unlined gunny sack 0.688 0.464
Lined gunny sack 0.249 0.433
Pesticide in the storage bag 0.305 0.461
Moisture meter 0 0
N 583
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Table 9.11: Summary statistics of surveyed grain commercializing households in Bihar
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Household size 4.443 2.434
Age 49.333 14.805
Proportion of income from non-agriculture sources 62.957 28.791
Proportion of income from wheat 9.276 12.951
Proportion of income from maize 10.835 15.557
Proportion of income from rice 8.148 13.242
Total landholding (ha) 1.417 9.725
Total area cultivating grains (ha) 1.143 13.517
Proportion who currently has a loan 0.23
Proportion who could borrow 5,000Rs. 0.998
Proportion who could borrow 20,000Rs. 0.957
Proportion who could borrow 100,000Rs. 0.425
Number selling wheat 346
Proportion of wheat farmers selling in trader’s shop 0.821
Proportion of wheat farmers selling on field 0.136
Quantity wheat Sold This Harvest (kg) 365.757 289.367
Number selling maize 298
Proportion of maize farmers selling in trader’s shop 0.513
Proportion of maize farmers selling on field 0.45
Quantity maize Sold This Harvest (kg) 1326.163 1560.725
Number selling rice 289
Proportion of rice farmers selling in trader’s shop 0.826
Proportion of rice farmers selling on field 0.097
Quantity rice Sold This Harvest (kg) 447.688 467.471
N 583
Table 9.12: Village market concentration in Bihar, based on survey of grain traders
Wheat Maize Rice
Number of traders 105 100 68
Average volume (100kg/month) 42.38 37.30 62.94
Traders per village 2.035 1.952 1.206
Village herfindahl 0.688 0.687 0.620
Villages with one trader 25 25 42
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Figure 9.1: The Grain Supply Chain of Parana´
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Figure 9.2: The Grain Supply Chain of Bihar
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Table 9.13: Summary statistics of agricultural traders in Bihar, India, 2015
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Demographics
Age of Trader in Years 44.617 10.029
Years working as a trader 15.047 7.941
Proportion attended some secondary education 0.579 0.496
Proprtion high caste 0.075 0.264
Supply chain
Proportion who farm 0.766 0.425
Proportion who purchase wheat 0.981 0.136
Proportion who purchase maize 0.935 0.248
Proportion who purchase rice 0.654 0.478
Proportion who buy grain from other traders 0.159 0.367
Proportion only wheat trader in village 0.131 0.339
Proportion only maize trader in village 0.159 0.367
Proportion only rice trader in village 0.318 0.468
Number of villages trader works in 3.85 2.145
Number of farmers trader buys from 74.570 51.983
Number of traders trader buys from 1.243 3.997
Market share wheat 0.467 0.279
Market share maize 0.48 0.313
Market share rice 0.565 0.301
Storage
Proportion who sell to trader 0.832 0.376
Proportion who sell to mill 0.224 0.419
Proportion who sell to retail 0.29 0.456
Proportion who sell to feed 0.178 0.384
Proportion who store in jute bag 0.991 0.097
Proportion who store in woven plastic bag 0.075 0.264
Proportion who store in hermetic bag 0.056 0.231
Proportion who store in metal silo 0.028 0.166
Proportion who could get a higher profit storing 0.159 0.367
Reasons for not storing (Proportion responding)
It costs too much 0.925 0.264
Need to sell immediately to repay farmers 0.925 0.264
Lose grain to moisture, rotting during storage 0.879 0.328
Prices don’t go up after harvest 0.15 0.358
Volume too large to find storage 0.065 0.248
Credit
Proportion who could get 50,000 rupees credit 0.86 0.349
Proportion who could get 100,000 rupees credit 0.598 0.493
N 107
Table 9.14: Post-Harvest Average Prices in Bihar (2015-2016), Rupees per kg
Wheat Maize Rice
Household price at harvest 12.90 11.53 10.35
Trader purchase price at harvest 11.7 10.1 9.49
Trader sale price at harvest 12.6 11.2 10.7
Government price floor (MSP) 14.5 13.25 14.5/14.1*
1
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Table 9.15: Moisture discounts (as percent of total weight), as used in Parana´ by cooperatives Integrada and
COCAMAR
Moisture level Corn, Integrada & COCAMAR Soybeans, Integrada Soybeans, COCAMAR
14.0 0 0 0
14.5 1.0 0.7 0.75
15.0 1.75 2.4 1.45
15.5 2.5 2 2.1
16.0 3.25 2.7 2.8
16.5 4 3.4 3.5
17.0 4.75 4 4.29
17.5 5.5 4.7 5.0
18.0 6.25 5.3 5.7
18.5 7.0 6.0 6.5
19.0 7.75 6.6 7.2
19.5 8.5 7.3 7.9
20.0 9.25 8 8.6
20.5 10.0 8.7 9.6
21.0 10.75 9.4 10.58
21.5 11.5 10.10 11.344
22.0 12.25 10.8 12.09
22.5 13.0 11.5 12.85
23.0 13.75 12.9 14.36
Table 9.16: Discount for broken corn, as used in Parana´ by cooperative COCAMAR
Percent of broken grains Discount (As a percent of weight)
< 6 0
6 1.0
7 2.0
8 3.0
9 4.0
10 5.0
11 6.0
12 8.0
13 10.0
14 13.0
15 16.0
16 19.0
17 23.0
18 27.0
19 31.0
20 35.0
> 20 Unclassified Corn
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Table 9.17: Village fixed effects model of the purchase price of surveyed traders in Bihar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Discount Price Discount Price Discount
VARIABLES wheat wheat maize maize rice rice
Market share -34.93** -16.96* 5.247 -15.34* -96.43** -16.32
(15.72) (9.852) (19.75) (9.088) (37.99) (20.85)
Buys grain from other traders 21.53*** 21.41*** -0.121 0.454 79.31*** 4.098
(6.684) (6.696) (10.58) (10.13) (20.95) (6.946)
Sells to mills or retailers 12.06 -0.0606 4.983 5.610 -7.039 -4.021
(7.357) (6.421) (5.503) (15.46) (13.58) (5.535)
Sell to feed -18.55** -12.36* -28.25 -5.780 -2.184 1.877
(7.169) (7.192) (21.56) (9.378) (15.18) (6.105)
High caste 33.53** 18.02* 14.89 21.36 81.41 9.742
(16.13) (9.793) (11.43) (14.42) (73.24) (12.08)
Attended some secondary education -2.757 -14.46 -4.021 -2.202 29.53* 11.41**
(9.334) (8.621) (6.281) (7.694) (15.24) (5.232)
Years working as a trader -0.613 -1.602* 0.717 -0.629 0.717 -0.0766
(0.534) (0.880) (1.069) (0.683) (0.708) (0.587)
Observations 105 98 100 93 69 68
R-squared 0.218 0.219 0.066 0.152 0.572 0.221
Number of Villages 49 48 48 47 39 39
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9.18: Village fixed effects model of the sale price of surveyed traders in Bihar
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price Price Price
VARIABLES wheat maize rice Market Power
Buys grain from other traders -8.795 98.19*** -27.47 0.309***
(12.35) (27.28) (55.96) (0.0772)
Sell to mill 41.26** 24.93 15.14 0.0266
(16.50) (23.75) (26.11) (0.0496)
Sell to retail -21.64 37.77 16.89 0.00404
(18.01) (31.66) (20.74) (0.0925)
Sell to feed -63.19** -49.38* -83.67 0.0995
(26.98) (25.47) (58.16) (0.0719)
Number of villages trader works in 0.433 6.283 1.291 0.0161
(2.011) (5.223) (3.948) (0.0125)
High caste 59.09** 27.85 95.47* -0.0648
(22.51) (23.72) (56.07) (0.0779)
Attended some secondary education 25.22* -11.46 8.046 0.0987*
(14.21) (10.35) (17.58) (0.0554)
Years working as a trader 3.297** 0.227 1.223 -0.00378
(1.373) (1.299) (1.195) (0.00477)
Maize observation -0.00944
(0.00799)
Rice observation 0.0886***
(0.0295)
Observations 105 100 70 332
R-squared 0.387 0.397 0.404 0.168
Number of Villages 49 48 40 49
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9.19: Hedonic models of grain price received by surveyed households in Bihar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Price Price Price Price Price
VARIABLES wheat wheat maize maize rice rice
Trader’s market power -0.206 -0.477 -0.302*
(0.309) (0.316) (0.160)
Cannot sell to -0.640*** -0.678*** -0.173*
another trader (0.168) (0.199) (0.0918)
Quantity sold -0.000366 -0.000218 -0.000177*** -0.000106 -8.47e-05 -1.54e-05
(0.000261) (0.000255) (5.49e-05) (6.94e-05) (0.000113) (8.21e-05)
More impurities -0.551 -0.496 0.191 0.374 -0.728*** -0.902***
(0.562) (0.610) (0.536) (0.536) (0.246) (0.190)
Less impurities 0.0875 0.369** -0.0581 -0.0786 0.0164 -0.0662
(0.172) (0.180) (0.182) (0.193) (0.112) (0.0893)
More brokens 0.258 0.123 -0.638 -0.554 0.498** 0.799***
(0.553) (0.598) (0.620) (0.639) (0.223) (0.176)
Less brokens 0.0702 0.131 0.240 0.410** -0.202* -0.216**
(0.162) (0.164) (0.175) (0.191) (0.122) (0.0947)
More size 0.218 0.297 -0.489* -0.907*** -0.267 -0.469**
(0.375) (0.378) (0.263) (0.290) (0.280) (0.207)
Less size -0.366** -0.337** -0.237 -0.328 0.370** -0.0965
(0.161) (0.164) (0.197) (0.212) (0.159) (0.126)
More color 0.620 0.784* -0.280 -0.366 -0.0621 0.325*
(0.408) (0.442) (0.300) (0.307) (0.221) (0.165)
Less color -0.132 0.0233 0.0113 -0.0444 -0.00433 0.167*
(0.170) (0.180) (0.187) (0.205) (0.124) (0.0953)
More moisture -0.576 -1.031 1.131** 1.604*** -0.648** -0.695***
(0.626) (0.702) (0.463) (0.494) (0.321) (0.235)
Less moisture -0.0492 -0.0530 -0.321 -0.0390 -0.0239 -0.117
(0.211) (0.220) (0.210) (0.225) (0.143) (0.116)
Observations 346 296 296 255 296 248
R-squared 0.049 0.107 0.095 0.139 0.107 0.281
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9.20: Alternate hedonic specifications of grain price received by surveyed households in Bihar
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hedonic model Block FE Block FE Hedonic model
VARIABLES Household controls No controls Household controls Past quality
Wheat
Trader’s market power -0.437 -0.206 -0.359 -0.171
(0.274) (0.311) (0.301) (0.293)
Cannot sell to another trader -0.0506 -0.543 -0.301 -0.487***
(0.169) (0.384) (0.240) (0.175)
Observations 296 296 296 296
R-squared 0.412 0.108 0.303 0.132
Number of blocknum 7 7
Maize
Trader’s market power -0.333 -0.190 -0.0503 -0.320
(0.300) (0.144) (0.180) (0.321)
Cannot sell to another trader -0.331 0.0127 -0.0431 -0.570***
(0.206) (0.113) (0.0529) (0.192)
Observations 255 255 255 255
R-squared 0.392 0.219 0.314 0.174
Number of blocknum 6 6
Rice
Trader’s market power -0.403** -0.112 -0.202 -0.387**
(0.171) (0.234) (0.294) (0.177)
Cannot sell to another trader -0.168 0.0218 0.0382 -0.194*
(0.109) (0.0822) (0.107) (0.105)
Observations 248 248 248 248
R-squared 0.439 0.154 0.297 0.141
Number of blocknum 6 6
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9.21: Estimations of quality premia and the coefficient on the interaction of quality and market power
in Bihar, India
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Wheat Maize Rice
More impurities -11.74** -1.793 0.567
(5.377) (2.395) (0.629)
More impurities * market power 13.60** 2.922 -1.900**
(6.505) (3.228) (0.784)
Less impurities -1.252*** -0.696 0.167
(0.386) (0.669) (0.291)
Less impurities * market power 2.750*** 0.838 -0.266
(0.670) (1.095) (0.507)
More brokens 0.853 -2.433 0.198
(2.821) (3.360) (0.617)
More brokens * market power -0.184 3.303 1.116
(4.014) (4.482) (0.965)
Less brokens -0.161 -0.580 0.572*
(0.373) (0.667) (0.308)
Less brokens * market power 0.529 1.127 -1.518***
(0.627) (1.119) (0.481)
More size 0.928 0.864 -0.212
(1.011) (1.374) (0.502)
More size * market power -0.452 -2.170 -0.344
(1.921) (2.321) (1.043)
Less size -0.310 -1.075 0.233
(0.383) (0.720) (0.416)
Less size * market power 0.0594 1.183 -0.442
(0.668) (1.130) (0.676)
More color 0.975 -1.288 -0.618
(1.588) (1.163) (0.471)
More color * market power -0.219 2.042 1.301
(2.001) (1.619) (0.826)
Less color -0.652* 0.183 0.602**
(0.362) (0.682) (0.284)
Less color * market power 0.725 -0.0792 -1.425***
(0.618) (1.190) (0.470)
More moisture 2.823 -1.484 0.106
(5.713) (3.636) (0.564)
More moisture * market power -3.903 3.061 -1.457
(6.803) (4.059) (0.939)
Less moisture -0.161 -0.395 0.455
(0.490) (0.778) (0.329)
Less moisture * market power 0.0572 -0.407 -1.074*
(0.946) (1.321) (0.610)
Observations 296 256 249
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9.22: Average market power of households producing high, average, and low quality grain in Bihar
Crop Wheat Maize Rice
Quality level Low Average High Low Average High Low Average High
Number of households
impurities 5 211 80 8 154 94 16 126 107
brokens 5 164 127 5 135 116 14 165 70
color 100 186 10 88 139 29 77 152 20
size 108 175 13 71 151 34 32 206 11
moisture 4 240 52 11 180 65 8 190 51
Average market share
impurities 0.823 0.531 0.514 0.693 0.472 0.573 0.762 0.626 0.475
brokens 0.688 0.503 0.563 0.709 0.480 0.550 0.587 0.558 0.595
color 0.514 0.529 0.770 0.431 0.537 0.669 0.525 0.601 0.501
size 0.512 0.547 0.489 0.592 0.471 0.556 0.555 0.582 0.386
moisture 0.835 0.543 0.455 0.882 0.490 0.525 0.483 0.603 0.460
Table 9.23: Household reported quality of wheat by block in Bihar
Block
Chowrahi Goradih Kharik Mans. Rajaun Shivaj. Tajpur Total
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
Average Herfindahl 0.504 0.543 0.406 0.765 0.692 0.562 0.710 0.533
Impurities of wheat
More (n=5) 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 3.0 5.0
Less (n=87) 6.0 40.0 13.0 6.0 9.0 6.0 7.0 87.0
Same (n=217) 64.0 71.0 20.0 21.0 0.0 37.0 4.0 217.0
Total (n=309) 70.0 112.0 33.0 27.0 10.0 43.0 14.0 309.0
Pearson chi2(12) = 92.0180 Pr = 0.000
Brokens of wheat
More (n=5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 5.0
Less (n=134) 47.0 42.0 14.0 10.0 8.0 9.0 4.0 134.0
Same (n=170) 23.0 70.0 19.0 17.0 2.0 32.0 7.0 170.0
Total (n=309) 70.0 112.0 33.0 27.0 10.0 43.0 14.0 309.0
Pearson chi2(12) = 72.5123 Pr = 0.000
Color of wheat
More (n=12) 4.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 4.0 2.0 12.0
Less (n=107) 3.0 46.0 20.0 7.0 8.0 22.0 1.0 107.0
Same (n=190) 63.0 66.0 12.0 19.0 2.0 17.0 11.0 190.0
Total (n=309) 70.0 112.0 33.0 27.0 10.0 43.0 14.0 309.0
Pearson chi2(12) = 71.8703 Pr = 0.000
Size of wheat
More (n=13) 5.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 1.0 13.0
Less (n=112) 37.0 34.0 15.0 9.0 0.0 12.0 5.0 112.0
Same (n=184) 28.0 78.0 16.0 18.0 9.0 27.0 8.0 184.0
Total (n=309) 70.0 112.0 33.0 27.0 10.0 43.0 14.0 309.0
Pearson chi2(12) = 31.9392 Pr = 0.001
Moisture of wheat
More (n=4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.0
Less (n=55) 0.0 24.0 16.0 0.0 1.0 9.0 5.0 55.0
Same (n=250) 70.0 88.0 17.0 26.0 9.0 34.0 6.0 250.0
Total (n=309) 70.0 112.0 33.0 27.0 10.0 43.0 14.0 309.0
Pearson chi2(12) = 97.3451 Pr = 0.000
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Table 9.24: Household reported quality of wheat compared to last harvest by block in Bihar
Block
Chowrahi Goradih Kharik Mans. Rajaun Shivaj. Tajpur Total
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
Average Herfindahl 0.504 0.543 0.406 0.765 0.692 0.562 0.710 0.533
Impurities of wheat
More (n=16) 0.0 7.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 2.0 16.0
Less (n=145) 44.0 55.0 18.0 3.0 9.0 9.0 7.0 145.0
Same (n=145) 25.0 50.0 13.0 24.0 1.0 27.0 5.0 145.0
Total (n=306) 69.0 112.0 33.0 27.0 10.0 41.0 14.0 306.0
Pearson chi2(12) = 51.6458 Pr = 0.000
Brokens of wheat
More (n=9) 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 9.0
Less (n=183) 63.0 64.0 17.0 8.0 2.0 24.0 5.0 183.0
Same (n=114) 6.0 46.0 14.0 19.0 8.0 17.0 4.0 114.0
Total (n=306) 69.0 112.0 33.0 27.0 10.0 41.0 14.0 306.0
Pearson chi2(12) = 106.2509 Pr = 0.000
Color of wheat
More (n=62) 49.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 7.0 2.0 62.0
Less (n=100) 5.0 42.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 14.0 4.0 100.0
Same (n=144) 15.0 70.0 16.0 15.0 0.0 20.0 8.0 144.0
Total (n=306) 69.0 112.0 33.0 27.0 10.0 41.0 14.0 306.0
Pearson chi2(12) = 169.1420 Pr = 0.000
Size of wheat
More (n=18) 8.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 6.0 1.0 18.0
Less (n=81) 10.0 26.0 17.0 11.0 8.0 4.0 5.0 81.0
Same (n=207) 51.0 85.0 15.0 16.0 1.0 31.0 8.0 207.0
Total (n=306) 69.0 112.0 33.0 27.0 10.0 41.0 14.0 306.0
Pearson chi2(12) = 55.6998 Pr = 0.000
Moisture of wheat
More (n=8) 0.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 8.0
Less (n=76) 4.0 26.0 15.0 0.0 9.0 19.0 3.0 76.0
Same (n=222) 65.0 85.0 16.0 25.0 0.0 21.0 10.0 222.0
Total (n=306) 69.0 112.0 33.0 27.0 10.0 41.0 14.0 306.0
Pearson chi2(12) = 76.0646 Pr = 0.000
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Table 9.25: Household reported quality of maize by block in Bihar
Block
Chowrahi Goradih Kharik Mans. Shivaj. Tajpur Total
No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
Average Herfindahl 0.496 0.627 0.493 0.912 0.600 0.757 0.605
Impurities of maize
More (n=8) 0.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 8.0
Less (n=97) 4.0 4.0 51.0 18.0 13.0 7.0 97.0
Same (n=162) 41.0 9.0 72.0 13.0 17.0 10.0 162.0
Total (n=267) 45.0 14.0 126.0 31.0 31.0 20.0 267.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 36.8310 Pr = 0.000
Brokens of maize
More (n=5) 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 5.0
Less (n=126) 37.0 1.0 59.0 14.0 9.0 6.0 126.0
Same (n=136) 8.0 13.0 65.0 17.0 20.0 13.0 136.0
Total (n=267) 45.0 14.0 126.0 31.0 31.0 20.0 267.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 42.7107 Pr = 0.000
Color of maize
More (n=33) 4.0 2.0 9.0 8.0 5.0 5.0 33.0
Less (n=91) 0.0 3.0 73.0 4.0 8.0 3.0 91.0
Same (n=143) 41.0 9.0 44.0 19.0 18.0 12.0 143.0
Total (n=267) 45.0 14.0 126.0 31.0 31.0 20.0 267.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 75.5429 Pr = 0.000
Size of maize
More (n=39) 24.0 0.0 5.0 1.0 6.0 3.0 39.0
Less (n=74) 0.0 1.0 49.0 17.0 3.0 4.0 74.0
Same (n=154) 21.0 13.0 72.0 13.0 22.0 13.0 154.0
Total (n=267) 45.0 14.0 126.0 31.0 31.0 20.0 267.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 100.2475 Pr = 0.000
Moisture of maize
More (n=12) 0.0 0.0 2.0 8.0 0.0 2.0 12.0
Less (n=65) 0.0 2.0 50.0 1.0 6.0 6.0 65.0
Same (n=190) 45.0 12.0 74.0 22.0 25.0 12.0 190.0
Total (n=267) 45.0 14.0 126.0 31.0 31.0 20.0 267.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 78.2181 Pr = 0.000
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Table 9.26: Household reported quality of maize compared to last harvest by block in Bihar
Block
Chowrahi Goradih Kharik Mans. Shivaj. Tajpur Total
No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
Average Herfindahl 0.496 0.627 0.493 0.912 0.600 0.757 0.605
Impurities of maize
More (n=8) 0.0 1.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 8.0
Less (n=166) 28.0 6.0 91.0 17.0 12.0 12.0 166.0
Same (n=91) 17.0 6.0 30.0 14.0 18.0 6.0 91.0
Total (n=265) 45.0 13.0 126.0 31.0 30.0 20.0 265.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 24.6071 Pr = 0.006
Brokens of maize
More (n=13) 0.0 1.0 4.0 0.0 2.0 6.0 13.0
Less (n=182) 44.0 5.0 98.0 17.0 16.0 2.0 182.0
Same (n=70) 1.0 7.0 24.0 14.0 12.0 12.0 70.0
Total (n=265) 45.0 13.0 126.0 31.0 30.0 20.0 265.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 82.3058 Pr = 0.000
Color of maize
More (n=48) 26.0 0.0 9.0 8.0 3.0 2.0 48.0
Less (n=79) 0.0 1.0 61.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 79.0
Same (n=138) 19.0 12.0 56.0 17.0 21.0 13.0 138.0
Total (n=265) 45.0 13.0 126.0 31.0 30.0 20.0 265.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 93.9031 Pr = 0.000
Size of maize
More (n=16) 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 16.0
Less (n=93) 2.0 1.0 67.0 19.0 2.0 2.0 93.0
Same (n=156) 43.0 12.0 51.0 12.0 24.0 14.0 156.0
Total (n=265) 45.0 13.0 126.0 31.0 30.0 20.0 265.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 82.4536 Pr = 0.000
Moisture of maize
More (n=16) 0.0 0.0 4.0 8.0 1.0 3.0 16.0
Less (n=62) 0.0 2.0 47.0 0.0 4.0 9.0 62.0
Same (n=187) 45.0 11.0 75.0 23.0 25.0 8.0 187.0
Total (n=265) 45.0 13.0 126.0 31.0 30.0 20.0 265.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 73.6055 Pr = 0.000
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Table 9.27: Household reported quality of rice by block in Bihar
Block
Chowrahi Goradih Kharik Rajaun Shivajinagar Tajpur Total
No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
Average Herfindahl 0.815 0.480 0.444 0.679 0.589 0.686 0.542
Impurities of rice
More (n=18) 0.0 6.0 0.0 8.0 1.0 3.0 18.0
Less (n=117) 1.0 79.0 2.0 13.0 18.0 4.0 117.0
Same (n=151) 48.0 80.0 0.0 1.0 21.0 1.0 151.0
Total (n=286) 49.0 165.0 2.0 22.0 40.0 8.0 286.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 106.5548 Pr = 0.000
Brokens of rice
More (n=18) 1.0 6.0 1.0 1.0 6.0 3.0 18.0
Less (n=76) 4.0 48.0 1.0 14.0 6.0 3.0 76.0
Same (n=192) 44.0 111.0 0.0 7.0 28.0 2.0 192.0
Total (n=286) 49.0 165.0 2.0 22.0 40.0 8.0 286.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 58.7804 Pr = 0.000
Color of rice
More (n=22) 1.0 11.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 2.0 22.0
Less (n=93) 2.0 49.0 1.0 18.0 21.0 2.0 93.0
Same (n=171) 46.0 105.0 0.0 2.0 14.0 4.0 171.0
Total (n=286) 49.0 165.0 2.0 22.0 40.0 8.0 286.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 70.3827 Pr = 0.000
Size of rice
More (n=13) 0.0 2.0 0.0 6.0 3.0 2.0 13.0
Less (n=40) 3.0 22.0 0.0 4.0 10.0 1.0 40.0
Same (n=233) 46.0 141.0 2.0 12.0 27.0 5.0 233.0
Total (n=286) 49.0 165.0 2.0 22.0 40.0 8.0 286.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 50.3397 Pr = 0.000
Moisture of rice
More (n=8) 0.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 2.0 0.0 8.0
Less (n=59) 2.0 36.0 1.0 12.0 5.0 3.0 59.0
Same (n=219) 47.0 126.0 1.0 7.0 33.0 5.0 219.0
Total (n=286) 49.0 165.0 2.0 22.0 40.0 8.0 286.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 42.9812 Pr = 0.000
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Table 9.28: Household reported quality of rice compared to last harvest by block in Bihar
Block
Chowrahi Goradih Kharik Rajaun Shivajinagar Tajpur Total
No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
Average Herfindahl 0.815 0.480 0.444 0.679 0.589 0.686 0.542
Impurities of rice
More (n=17) 0.0 14.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 17.0
Less (n=97) 4.0 58.0 1.0 21.0 12.0 1.0 97.0
Same (n=165) 43.0 91.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 6.0 165.0
Total (n=279) 47.0 163.0 1.0 22.0 38.0 8.0 279.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 63.9414 Pr = 0.000
Brokens of rice
More (n=22) 0.0 5.0 0.0 6.0 10.0 1.0 22.0
Less (n=125) 39.0 71.0 1.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 125.0
Same (n=132) 8.0 87.0 0.0 10.0 24.0 3.0 132.0
Total (n=279) 47.0 163.0 1.0 22.0 38.0 8.0 279.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 76.2524 Pr = 0.000
Color of rice
More (n=17) 3.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 8.0 0.0 17.0
Less (n=73) 2.0 46.0 0.0 17.0 6.0 2.0 73.0
Same (n=189) 42.0 114.0 1.0 2.0 24.0 6.0 189.0
Total (n=279) 47.0 163.0 1.0 22.0 38.0 8.0 279.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 68.9457 Pr = 0.000
Size of rice
More (n=17) 0.0 5.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 17.0
Less (n=40) 1.0 24.0 1.0 8.0 4.0 2.0 40.0
Same (n=222) 46.0 134.0 0.0 10.0 30.0 2.0 222.0
Total (n=279) 47.0 163.0 1.0 22.0 38.0 8.0 279.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 64.8039 Pr = 0.000
Moisture of rice
More (n=7) 0.0 4.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 7.0
Less (n=68) 2.0 31.0 0.0 20.0 9.0 6.0 68.0
Same (n=204) 45.0 128.0 1.0 1.0 27.0 2.0 204.0
Total (n=279) 47.0 163.0 1.0 22.0 38.0 8.0 279.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 82.0120 Pr = 0.000
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Table 9.29: Distribution of wheat quality with and without technology in Bihar
More Less Same Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Impurities of wheat
Lay grain on sheet
Has never used (n=207) 3.0 42.9 70.0 70.0 134.0 55.1 207.0 59.1
Has used (n=143) 4.0 57.1 30.0 30.0 109.0 44.9 143.0 40.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 7.2546 Pr = 0.027
Manual threshing
Has never used (n=133) 5.0 71.4 28.0 28.0 100.0 41.2 133.0 38.0
Has used (n=217) 2.0 28.6 72.0 72.0 143.0 58.8 217.0 62.0
Pearson chi2(2) = 8.5895 Pr = 0.014
Lined gunny sack
Has never used (n=227) 4.0 57.1 65.0 65.0 158.0 65.0 227.0 64.9
Has used (n=123) 3.0 42.9 35.0 35.0 85.0 35.0 123.0 35.1
Pearson chi2(2) = 0.1865 Pr = 0.911
Pesticide in the storage bag
Has never used (n=198) 4.0 57.1 73.0 73.0 121.0 49.8 198.0 56.6
Has used (n=152) 3.0 42.9 27.0 27.0 122.0 50.2 152.0 43.4
Pearson chi2(2) = 15.5295 Pr = 0.000
Brokens of wheat
Lay grain on sheet
Has never used (n=207) 5.0 71.4 80.0 51.3 122.0 65.2 207.0 59.1
Has used (n=143) 2.0 28.6 76.0 48.7 65.0 34.8 143.0 40.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 7.3040 Pr = 0.026
Manual threshing
Has never used (n=133) 2.0 28.6 57.0 36.5 74.0 39.6 133.0 38.0
Has used (n=217) 5.0 71.4 99.0 63.5 113.0 60.4 217.0 62.0
Pearson chi2(2) = 0.6018 Pr = 0.740
Lined gunny sack
Has never used (n=227) 2.0 28.6 95.0 60.9 130.0 69.5 227.0 64.9
Has used (n=123) 5.0 71.4 61.0 39.1 57.0 30.5 123.0 35.1
Pearson chi2(2) = 6.8996 Pr = 0.032
Pesticide in the storage bag
Has never used (n=198) 4.0 57.1 83.0 53.2 111.0 59.4 198.0 56.6
Has used (n=152) 3.0 42.9 73.0 46.8 76.0 40.6 152.0 43.4
Pearson chi2(2) = 1.3116 Pr = 0.519
Moisture of wheat
Lay grain on sheet
Has never used (n=207) 3.0 50.0 59.0 86.8 145.0 52.5 207.0 59.1
Has used (n=143) 3.0 50.0 9.0 13.2 131.0 47.5 143.0 40.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 26.6635 Pr = 0.000
Manual threshing
Has never used (n=133) 2.0 33.3 22.0 32.4 109.0 39.5 133.0 38.0
Has used (n=217) 4.0 66.7 46.0 67.6 167.0 60.5 217.0 62.0
Pearson chi2(2) = 1.2369 Pr = 0.539
Lined gunny sack
Has never used (n=227) 3.0 50.0 47.0 69.1 177.0 64.1 227.0 64.9
Has used (n=123) 3.0 50.0 21.0 30.9 99.0 35.9 123.0 35.1
Pearson chi2(2) = 1.1866 Pr = 0.553
Pesticide in the storage bag
Has never used (n=198) 3.0 50.0 54.0 79.4 141.0 51.1 198.0 56.6
Has used (n=152) 3.0 50.0 14.0 20.6 135.0 48.9 152.0 43.4
Pearson chi2(2) = 17.9237 Pr = 0.000
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Table 9.30: Distribution of maize quality with and without technology in Bihar
More Less Same Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Impurities of maize
Lay grain on sheet
Has never used (n=209) 5.0 55.6 85.0 75.9 119.0 65.4 209.0 69.0
Has used (n=94) 4.0 44.4 27.0 24.1 63.0 34.6 94.0 31.0
Pearson chi2(2) = 4.3586 Pr = 0.113
Manual threshing
Has never used (n=123) 4.0 44.4 59.0 52.7 60.0 33.0 123.0 40.6
Has used (n=180) 5.0 55.6 53.0 47.3 122.0 67.0 180.0 59.4
Pearson chi2(2) = 11.2280 Pr = 0.004
Lined gunny sack
Has never used (n=219) 4.0 44.4 80.0 71.4 135.0 74.2 219.0 72.3
Has used (n=84) 5.0 55.6 32.0 28.6 47.0 25.8 84.0 27.7
Pearson chi2(2) = 3.8472 Pr = 0.146
Pesticide in the storage bag
Has never used (n=185) 6.0 66.7 70.0 62.5 109.0 59.9 185.0 61.1
Has used (n=118) 3.0 33.3 42.0 37.5 73.0 40.1 118.0 38.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 0.3214 Pr = 0.852
Brokens of maize
Lay grain on sheet
Has never used (n=209) 6.0 100.0 85.0 61.6 118.0 74.2 209.0 69.0
Has used (n=94) 0.0 0.0 53.0 38.4 41.0 25.8 94.0 31.0
Pearson chi2(2) = 8.2513 Pr = 0.016
Manual threshing
Has never used (n=123) 3.0 50.0 63.0 45.7 57.0 35.8 123.0 40.6
Has used (n=180) 3.0 50.0 75.0 54.3 102.0 64.2 180.0 59.4
Pearson chi2(2) = 3.1687 Pr = 0.205
Lined gunny sack
Has never used (n=219) 4.0 66.7 89.0 64.5 126.0 79.2 219.0 72.3
Has used (n=84) 2.0 33.3 49.0 35.5 33.0 20.8 84.0 27.7
Pearson chi2(2) = 8.1206 Pr = 0.017
Pesticide in the storage bag
Has never used (n=185) 4.0 66.7 78.0 56.5 103.0 64.8 185.0 61.1
Has used (n=118) 2.0 33.3 60.0 43.5 56.0 35.2 118.0 38.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 2.2000 Pr = 0.333
Moisture of maize
Lay grain on sheet
Has never used (n=209) 3.0 23.1 64.0 88.9 142.0 65.1 209.0 69.0
Has used (n=94) 10.0 76.9 8.0 11.1 76.0 34.9 94.0 31.0
Pearson chi2(2) = 27.6413 Pr = 0.000
Manual threshing
Has never used (n=123) 11.0 84.6 34.0 47.2 78.0 35.8 123.0 40.6
Has used (n=180) 2.0 15.4 38.0 52.8 140.0 64.2 180.0 59.4
Pearson chi2(2) = 13.8535 Pr = 0.001
Lined gunny sack
Has never used (n=219) 6.0 46.2 62.0 86.1 151.0 69.3 219.0 72.3
Has used (n=84) 7.0 53.8 10.0 13.9 67.0 30.7 84.0 27.7
Pearson chi2(2) = 12.2908 Pr = 0.002
Pesticide in the storage bag
Has never used (n=185) 7.0 53.8 62.0 86.1 116.0 53.2 185.0 61.1
Has used (n=118) 6.0 46.2 10.0 13.9 102.0 46.8 118.0 38.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 24.9356 Pr = 0.000
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Table 9.31: Distribution of rice quality with and without technology in Bihar
More Less Same Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Impurities of rice
Lay grain on sheet
Has never used (n=218) 9.0 47.4 99.0 81.1 110.0 64.0 218.0 69.6
Has used (n=95) 10.0 52.6 23.0 18.9 62.0 36.0 95.0 30.4
Pearson chi2(2) = 14.7318 Pr = 0.001
Manual threshing
Has never used (n=91) 9.0 47.4 44.0 36.1 38.0 22.1 91.0 29.1
Has used (n=222) 10.0 52.6 78.0 63.9 134.0 77.9 222.0 70.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 10.0408 Pr = 0.007
Lined gunny sack
Has never used (n=202) 8.0 42.1 94.0 77.0 100.0 58.1 202.0 64.5
Has used (n=111) 11.0 57.9 28.0 23.0 72.0 41.9 111.0 35.5
Pearson chi2(2) = 15.5984 Pr = 0.000
Pesticide in the storage bag
Has never used (n=210) 12.0 63.2 100.0 82.0 98.0 57.0 210.0 67.1
Has used (n=103) 7.0 36.8 22.0 18.0 74.0 43.0 103.0 32.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 20.3312 Pr = 0.000
Brokens of rice
Lay grain on sheet
Has never used (n=218) 15.0 83.3 56.0 65.9 147.0 70.0 218.0 69.6
Has used (n=95) 3.0 16.7 29.0 34.1 63.0 30.0 95.0 30.4
Pearson chi2(2) = 2.1772 Pr = 0.337
Manual threshing
Has never used (n=91) 6.0 33.3 26.0 30.6 59.0 28.1 91.0 29.1
Has used (n=222) 12.0 66.7 59.0 69.4 151.0 71.9 222.0 70.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 0.3504 Pr = 0.839
Lined gunny sack
Has never used (n=202) 9.0 50.0 58.0 68.2 135.0 64.3 202.0 64.5
Has used (n=111) 9.0 50.0 27.0 31.8 75.0 35.7 111.0 35.5
Pearson chi2(2) = 2.1758 Pr = 0.337
Pesticide in the storage bag
Has never used (n=210) 10.0 55.6 60.0 70.6 140.0 66.7 210.0 67.1
Has used (n=103) 8.0 44.4 25.0 29.4 70.0 33.3 103.0 32.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 1.5729 Pr = 0.455
Moisture of rice
Lay grain on sheet
Has never used (n=218) 8.0 88.9 53.0 80.3 157.0 66.0 218.0 69.6
Has used (n=95) 1.0 11.1 13.0 19.7 81.0 34.0 95.0 30.4
Pearson chi2(2) = 6.6467 Pr = 0.036
Manual threshing
Has never used (n=91) 2.0 22.2 20.0 30.3 69.0 29.0 91.0 29.1
Has used (n=222) 7.0 77.8 46.0 69.7 169.0 71.0 222.0 70.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 0.2540 Pr = 0.881
Lined gunny sack
Has never used (n=202) 7.0 77.8 52.0 78.8 143.0 60.1 202.0 64.5
Has used (n=111) 2.0 22.2 14.0 21.2 95.0 39.9 111.0 35.5
Pearson chi2(2) = 8.6080 Pr = 0.014
Pesticide in the storage bag
Has never used (n=210) 7.0 77.8 53.0 80.3 150.0 63.0 210.0 67.1
Has used (n=103) 2.0 22.2 13.0 19.7 88.0 37.0 103.0 32.9
Pearson chi2(2) = 7.4656 Pr = 0.024
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Table 9.32: Mean grain prices received this harvest by surveyed households in Bihar with and without
technology
Crop
Maize Rice Wheat
Mean price Mean price Mean price
Sun drying
Has never used 11.767 10.460 13.171
Has used 11.837 10.398 13.054
Lay grain on sheet
Has never used 11.647 10.405 12.604
Has used 12.244 10.384 13.716
Manual threshing
Has never used 11.524 10.532 13.467
Has used 12.055 10.349 12.800
Mechanical threshing
Has never used 12.000 10.286 15.500
Has used 11.831 10.405 13.042
Unlined gunny sack
Has never used 11.930 10.363 13.738
Has used 11.764 10.409 12.784
Lined gunny sack
Has never used 11.655 10.328 12.783
Has used 12.320 10.532 13.569
Pesticide in the storage bag
Has never used 11.571 10.339 12.530
Has used 12.250 10.526 13.731
Table 9.33: Grain price received by households in Bihar as a function of technology usage and market power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Price Price Price Price Price
VARIABLES wheat wheat maize maize rice rice
Trader market power -0.234 -0.750 -0.347
(0.309) (0.593) (0.243)
Cannot sell to -0.418** 0.167 -0.303**
another trader (0.180) (0.378) (0.146)
Quantity sold 0.000917** -0.000349 1.12e-05 0.000128 -0.000103 -5.13e-05
(0.000426) (0.000252) (0.000127) (0.000126) (0.000151) (0.000120)
Lay grain on sheet 0.471 0.178 0.195 0.208 -0.325 -0.425**
(0.334) (0.204) (0.499) (0.444) (0.201) (0.174)
Manual threshing -0.550** -0.0601 0.499 0.212 -0.207 -0.0669
(0.258) (0.158) (0.353) (0.332) (0.158) (0.129)
Lined gunny sack 0.311 0.0612 0.281 0.357 0.207 0.0464
(0.288) (0.175) (0.475) (0.426) (0.182) (0.155)
Pesticide in the 0.703** 0.125 0.427 0.828* 0.237 0.345*
storage bag (0.343) (0.225) (0.525) (0.493) (0.205) (0.186)
Observations 354 296 298 256 298 249
R-squared 0.094 0.066 0.022 0.044 0.021 0.064
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9.34: Sale quantity (kg) in Bihar India as a function of whether the sale took place on-field
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Quantity sold Quantity sold Quantity sold
Sells on field 177.2*** 1,688*** 391.1***
(44.40) (153.4) (88.65)
Observations 354 298 298
R-squared 0.043 0.290 0.062
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9.35: Hedonic model of grain price received by households in Bihar, controlling for sale location
(1) (2) (3)
Price Price Price
VARIABLES wheat maize rice
Quantity sold -0.000318 -3.84e-05 -8.14e-05
(0.000259) (7.30e-05) (8.29e-05)
Sells on field 0.460** -0.617*** 0.526***
(0.232) (0.230) (0.159)
Trader’s market power -0.0622 -0.601* -0.273*
(0.316) (0.316) (0.157)
Cannot sell to another trader -0.707*** -0.543*** -0.206**
(0.170) (0.203) (0.0905)
More impurities -0.472 0.242 -0.828***
(0.607) (0.532) (0.188)
Less impurities 0.380** -0.0564 -0.0400
(0.179) (0.190) (0.0878)
More brokens 0.133 -0.334 0.827***
(0.595) (0.637) (0.172)
Less brokens 0.126 0.467** -0.226**
(0.163) (0.190) (0.0928)
More size 0.273 -0.962*** -0.548***
(0.377) (0.287) (0.204)
Less size -0.347** -0.294 -0.0706
(0.163) (0.210) (0.124)
More color 0.715 -0.400 0.346**
(0.441) (0.304) (0.162)
Less color -0.0367 0.0614 0.126
(0.182) (0.206) (0.0942)
More moisture -0.996 1.521*** -0.671***
(0.698) (0.489) (0.231)
Less moisture -0.0570 0.118 -0.128
(0.219) (0.230) (0.113)
Observations 296 255 248
R-squared 0.119 0.164 0.313
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9.36: Grain price received by households selling on and off-farm in Bihar as a function of technology
usage and market power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price wheat Price wheat Price maize Price maize Price rice Price rice
VARIABLES on field off field on field off field on field off field
Trader market power 0.291 -0.0827 -0.405 -0.562 0.188 -0.301
(0.956) (0.322) (0.380) (0.471) (0.860) (0.188)
Cannot sell to 0.646* -0.397** 0.0682 -0.147 0.251 -0.302***
another trader (0.330) (0.200) (0.186) (0.366) (0.375) (0.113)
Quantity sold 0.000113 -0.00157*** 3.35e-05 -0.000163 -8.74e-06 -0.000176
(0.000263) (0.000339) (5.36e-05) (0.000211) (7.81e-05) (0.000114)
Lay grain on sheet 2.871** 0.244 0.169 0.465 -0.470***
(1.161) (0.199) (0.298) (0.279) (0.133)
Manual threshing -0.126 -0.0770 0.0813 -0.107 0.521* -0.0796
(0.305) (0.169) (0.179) (0.299) (0.265) (0.100)
Lined gunny sack -3.508*** 0.274 0.387 0.0377
(0.925) (0.175) (0.290) (0.120)
Pesticide in the -1.315 0.409* 1.066 0.563 0.347**
storage bag (0.907) (0.227) (0.911) (0.361) (0.144)
Observations 42 254 114 141 18 230
R-squared 0.557 0.186 0.035 0.092 0.410 0.124
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9.37: Models of grain price in Bihar controlling for whether the trader sells directly to end users
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Price Price Price Price Price
VARIABLES wheat wheat maize maize rice rice
Sells to mill or retail -1.588*** -1.569*** -0.560 -0.872** -0.0688 0.0103
(0.124) (0.134) (0.360) (0.421) (0.155) (0.159)
Sells to feed 0.0376 -0.0263 0.294 0.520 0.397** 0.429*
(0.169) (0.197) (0.372) (0.420) (0.172) (0.223)
Trader’s market power 0.420 -1.028* -0.438*
(0.261) (0.609) (0.246)
Cannot sell to another trader -0.268* -0.509 -0.0999
(0.146) (0.371) (0.156)
Quantity sold -0.000537** -6.27e-05 3.30e-05
(0.000211) (0.000132) (0.000116)
More impurities -0.229 0.636 -0.674**
(0.501) (1.006) (0.274)
Less impurities 0.234 -0.142 0.130
(0.149) (0.363) (0.129)
More brokens 0.384 -0.760 0.966***
(0.491) (1.193) (0.265)
Less brokens 0.0960 0.0398 -0.104
(0.138) (0.358) (0.140)
More size 0.229 -0.536 -0.388
(0.319) (0.573) (0.296)
Less size -0.184 -0.466 0.0215
(0.139) (0.396) (0.181)
More color -0.153 -0.0821 0.209
(0.371) (0.573) (0.235)
Less color -0.207 0.179 0.0271
(0.149) (0.385) (0.144)
More moisture -0.468 1.666* -0.542
(0.578) (0.926) (0.342)
Less moisture -0.0687 -0.431 -0.0416
(0.180) (0.421) (0.164)
Observations 302 296 259 256 271 249
R-squared 0.355 0.406 0.010 0.063 0.020 0.167
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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